# 1NC

## Off-Case

### 1NC

T: USFG

#### Affs should defend hypothetical implementation of antitrust law in alignment with the resolution.

#### “Resolved” requires law

WP 64, (Words and Phrases, 1964, Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “USFG” means any of the three branches

US Code 88, 42 U.S. Code § 4914, “Development of low-noise-emission products,” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/4914>)

(2) The term “Federal Government” includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government of the United States, and the government of the District of Columbia.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayon, and FTC Acts

Kimmel & Fanchiang 20, \*Senior Counsel at Crowell & Moring, LLP in Washington, D.C., twenty years of experience as an antitrust lawyer, Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley \*\*associate in Crowell & Moring’s Irvine, CA office and a member of the firm’s antitrust and commercial litigation groups (Lisa Kimmel \*\*Eric Fanchiang, 2020, “Antitrust and Intellectual Property Licensing,” in 2020 Licensing Update, Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory U.S., https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1---fairness---a limited and predictable topic defines prep and research, while preventing the aff from skirting clash, moving to the fringes, and picking true arguments, which wrecks neg ground; this outweighs because debate’s a game---competition encourages research practices and innovation, which is a prerequisite to participation

#### 2---clash---open subjects cause monopolization of the moral high ground, which denies a role for the neg and prevents second level understanding and turns case

Grossberg 15, Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence Grossberg, 2015, “We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC,” <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9

[footnote 9 beings]

For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc.

[footnote 9 ends]

And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to produc[e]ing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

#### Policy debates over antitrust are valuable

Waller & Morse 20, \*John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law; Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law \*\*J.D. Expected 2021, Loyola University Chicago School of Law (\*Spencer Weber Waller \*\*Jacob Morse, 7-26-2020, "The Political Face of Antitrust," Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial, and Commercial Law, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3660946)

IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139 Conclusion Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

## Case

### 1NC---Presumption

#### Vote neg on presumption---their method can’t spill up and their research agenda fails because debaters are invested in competition.

### 1NC---Turn

#### Cosmopolitanism is ethnic cleansing that appeals to a homogenous elite while papering over distinct ethnicities and silencing identity politics.

Calhoun 8, University Professor of Social Sciences at Arizona State University, Former Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science, Former President of the Social Science Research Council, Ph.D. in Sociology from Oxford University, MA in Anthropology and Sociology (Craig Calhoun, 2008, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism, Volume 14, Issue 3, July, <https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2012/SAN237/um/Calhoun_cosmopolitan-and-nationalism.pdf>)

Imagining a world without nations, a world in which ethnicity is simply a consumer taste, a world in which each individual simply and directly inhabits the whole, is like imagining the melting pot in which all ethnicities vanish into the formation of a new kind of individual. In each case this produces an ideology especially attractive to some it neglects reasons why many reproduce ethnic or national distinctions. And perhaps most importantly it obscures the issues of inequality that make ethnically unmarked national identities accessible mainly to elites, and make an easy sense of being a citizen of the world contingent on having the right passports, credit cards and cultural credentials. American debates over immigration and assimilation predate independence, often as debates about the peopling of specific colonies, and shape both images of America and practical policies through the history of the United States. The dominant American ideology - common among scholars as well as the broader population - suggested that the first new nation' was precisely not an ethnic nation. Tom Paine famously held that Europe, not England is the parent country of America- though one might suggest that 'European' is itself an ethnic category of sorts, at least by comparison to, say, Asian or Latin American. In any event, British - and indeed, specifically English history loomed large in US school curricula. But both 'consensus historians (e.g. Higham, 1955) and later social scientists (e.g. Greenfield, 1992, Lipset, 1996) have commonly seen nativist movements as aberrations recurrently overcome, and the main pattern idealized that transcends ethnicity. This view perhaps grasps an element of truth in its contrasts to Europe, but it has been very uncritically held. From the beginning it failed to confront both the fundamental challenge of racial domination and the continuing hegemony of an elite constituted in part through ethnicity. Long described as WASP, this has broadened but not entirely disappeared, and continues to be reproduced in com mon experiences of education, religion and culture as well as networks of social relations.5 Recurrently, the notion of the ideal post-ethnic nation has also confronted waves of less elite nativist sentiment political agitation. And finally, the assertion of ethnic identities and the positive valuing of difference also have a long tradition, and one that has long made uncomfortable those who would see the struggle as only between assimilationists or cosmopolitans and nativists or racists. W.E.B. DuBois wrote famously of the double-consciousness of those for whom an ascriptive racial identity must always compete with an inclusive national identity. Yet, in The Souls of Black Folk he advocated no simple choice. 'One ever feels his two-ness,- an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivinigs: two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder (DuBois, 1994:2). The American Negro may long 'to merge his double-self into a better and truer self. But in this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American ...(DuBois, 1994: 3) Various sorts of "both/and identities are pervasive in the modern world. They are brought to the fore by international migration, by European integration, and by the claims of multiple states on common cultural traditions and identities, like China and Taiwan and for that matter Singapore. Islam and Christianity are each religions that produce common identities crossing national divisions. Gender, race and even engagement in social movements can produce 'both/and' identities (see Anzaldúa, 1987; Collins, 1990). Neither universalism nor essentialist nativism or nationalism deals well with these multiplicities and overlaps, and indeed it is common for universalists to imagine all claims to group solidarity on the model of nativist closure- and for nativists and nationalists to imagine all suggestions that multiple identities matter as rootless cosmopolitan' challenges to the integral whole. Celebration of multiple identities has recently come into vogue for example as multiculturalism- and has produced both universalist and particularist responses. I" Salman Rushdie says he writes love songs 'to our mongrel selves'; he refuses to be simply Indian, lives in England, and travels enough to show those who would stop him in the name of religious purity that they have failed (Rushdie, 2000: 394). Indeed, one might think it is hard for anyone to be simply Indian', so deeply plural and cross-cutting are the identities of the subcontinent. Yet there are other Indians living in England whose very sense of being is bound up with being Indian. And as Tariq Modood notes, many immigrants from India in the era of partition became Pakistanis without ever living in that country, and then in the dominant British politics of identity became Asian' and then more commonly Muslim (Modood et al., 2004). Indian' now distinguishes mainly Hindu Britons (ironically echoing the assertions of religious purity of some Hindu fundamentalists back on the subcontinent). There are also angry Englishmen determined to make sure that neither Indians nor Muslims ever feel they belong unequivocally to England's green and pleasant land. Of course there are also Indians in India for whom England is only ancient history and India itself somewhat abstract but for whom village or caste are central loca- tions. There are at least as many for whom a militantly Hindu account of being Indian is fundamentally compelling. And there are still other Indians for whom the Communist Party (or rather, one of them) is still vital and transcends ethnicity and nationality and others who love mathematics partly because it seems a universal language as well as a good source of that other universal, money. In England, when asked their national identity, those of Indian descent face the same puzzle as others: is the right answer English, British or just possibly European?" This sort of field of multiple and heterogeneously structured identities has become increasingly common in the contemporary world but it should not be thought that identities were ever quite so clear or singular in the past as ideology sometimes suggested. Colonialism produced plenty of examples and independence did not neatly straighten them out. Think of Léopold Senghor, first President of Senegal but before that a member of the French National Assembly and all the while a pan- Africanist, one of the founders of the idea and movement of negritude. Earlier empires produced their own such complexities, but even villages were not quite the homogenous communities of myth and nostalgia. From the 1960s to the 1990s multiculturalism was in vogue. The wave seems since to have crested. By 2007 a New York Times art critic could draw a contrast between Manhattan's somewhat more central art world and its Brooklyn cousin by saying Multiculturalist terms like identity hybridity and diversity may sound like words from a dead language in Chelsea, but they are the lingua franca of the Brooklyn show (Carter 2007), It's not only in the Chelsea galleries that 'identity' sounds passé it seems so 1990s to a range of social theoretical hipsters. They want to give identity and especially identity politics a rest and be cosmopolitan. But cosmopolitanism is claimed by multiculturalists as well as those who think multiculturalism has got out of hand and needs to be tamed by emphasis on universal humanity (and those who think multiculturalism is simply no longer trendy). Indeed the very idea of multiculturalism was also something of a theoretical muddle. On the one hand it suggested the essential malleability of identity and on the other the essential priority of identity (though both sides tended to condemn essentialism). The same went for the 'politics of identity. This meant most coherently that identity was always subject to politics - to struggles within groups over what they stood for, to struggles between those with different agendas over which identity would be primary. But to many it also meant sim- ply that different groups struggled politically to get due recognition for their identities or over issues in which the stakes were defined by group identity (see Calhoun, 1994). Cosmopolitanism is most often invoked by those who see identity politics as a sort of mistake - like lingering ethnonationalism, rather than citizenship of the world. But the issues have not gone away. European politics is rife with struggles over whether national identities or the common claim of 'European' should be primary. There are few African countries where claims for religious, or ethnic, or regional or 'tribal' identities are not sometimes as powerful as projects of national integration. Latin American countries find themselves common identity in the struggle against US domination, but internally are split by movements deriving significant force from indigenous resentment against elites defined in part by European ancestry (as well as cosmopolitan property). The economic rise of China both masks identity struggles within the People's Republic and intensifies others around Asia. And from the Middle East through South and South East Asia (and indeed in Europe, Africa and the US) Islamic renewal generates both struggles over identity and struggles defined by religious identities that modernization theorists had pronounced permanently fading.

### 1NC---Turn

#### If they do scale-up, they empower capitalism, which turns their impact

Cheah 6, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of California at Berkeley (Pheng Cheah, 2006, “Cosmopolitanism,” Theory, Culture & Society 23(2–3)

The feasibility of institutionalizing a mass-based cosmopolitan political consciousness therefore very much remains an open question today. It is not enough to fold the pluralistic ethos of older cosmopolitanisms into the institutionalized tolerance of diversity in multicultural societies. This kind of cosmopolitanism is only efficacious within the necessarily limited frame of the (now multiculturalized) democratic state in the North Atlantic that is sustained by global exploitation of the South. This type of limited cosmopolitanism has a more insidious counterpart in the state-sponsored cosmopolitanism of developed countries in Asia. Here, cosmopolitanism degenerates into a set of strategies for the biopolitical improvement of human capital. It becomes an ideology used by a state to attract high-end expatriate workers in the high-tech, finance, and other high-end service sectors as well as to justify its exploitation of its own citizens and the lower-end migrant workers who bear the burden of the country’s successful adaptation to flexible accumulation. Cosmopolitanism is here merely a symbolic marker of a country’s success at climbing the competitive hierarchy of the international division of labor and maintaining its position there. The inscription of new cosmopolitanisms (and theories about them) within the force field of uneven globalization must be broached at every turn.

### 1NC---AT: Cosmopolization

#### Cosmo is a disaster.

Colatrella, 20—associate adjunct professor of government and sociology at the University of Maryland University College (Steven, “Solidarity or Human Rights? National Sovereignty and Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century,” *Bringing the Nation Back In: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and the Struggle to Define a New Politics*, Chapter 2, pg 34-38, dml)

When one is seen by others to be only a human being, without any of the social, political or cultural characteristics that make one fully human, the result may be compassion and charity but it may also be just as likely be seen as an invitation to further abuse. “Bare life,” as Arendt and Agamben term it, cannot be the basis for human dignity.

For human rights still require states to enforce them, just not the same state that is repressing or violating them. But the enforcement of rights by external states or by “the international community” means war. Immanuel Kant warned that peace could not come from forcing a single state that refused to accept even a positive value or policy of the world community to get in line, since that is not peace but war (Kant). Machiavelli warned that republics need a plurality of republics, able to criticize each other, encourage each other to best practices, engage in competition. When all republics fall under a single central power—even a collective one—we find an empire, not a republic. A condition in which the world community was unanimous and forced a recalcitrant state into accepting policies it and its citizens had not approved would be analogous to empire, to that world polity that Arendt likewise warned would not result in a stronger enforcement of rights, but in the greatest threat to them, and one without external recourse for redress (Arendt 298).

Nor are these abstract problems. Mark Mazower has painstakingly shown that the entire conception of international law has always been based on the “standard of civilization” in which certain states were within such a standard, and so legitimized to enforce their conception of international law, while other peoples and states and communities were outside of it, and so vulnerable to having the will of others imposed upon them (Mazower 70). In short, colonialism, neocolonialism, and the current regime of human rights are closely linked, and it is no accident that the countries that find themselves targets of humanitarian interventions under the “responsibility to protect” are ones that are not within the current updated version of the standard of civilization—that is to say, not allies of the United States and often opposed to neoliberalism. Thus, even in shifting from the older national government’s responsibility to its own citizens to a conception that the international community has a responsibility to protect human rights, we find that we have merely changed which fox is guarding the chickens.

Human Rights and Global Citizenship

As a legalistic concept, human rights require a political authority to define what they are legally. One of the most widely cited works on human rights, Jack Donnelly’s Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice fails from the start on this point with its key analogy: human rights, like property rights, are a preexisting condition. This notion has already been dismantled by Arendt as shown above. By contrast, international relations theorists recognize that human rights must be granted and recognized by global institutions, but the lack of a central international authority makes this very difficult. The realist school of international relations (Morgenthau; Waltz) sees anarchy reigning in a state of nature in world politics, making the protection of human rights well nigh impossible. The so-called English School of International Relations sees an international society as precarious, in which norms, though real, are enforced by national states that see adherence to such norms as advantageous for maintaining the international society and in the interest of the individual states in question (Bull). These theories are united in that they see international organizations as instruments for carrying out what has already been agreed to by national states. Neither position posits a global polity as existing, and many theorists in each camp would see such a polity as undesirable.

Others are less pessimistic. Constructivists view human rights as a discourse that has achieved a certain degree of autonomy from institutional settings, though the geopolitical limits on the discourse remain (Risse; Ropp and Sikkinke 16). Some political theorists seek to found human rights solely on the narrow basis of historical liberal theory, with all the baggage that this involves—from class privilege and economic doctrine to the policies of existing international organizations such as the IMF and WTO, and with the historical affiliation with Anglo-American hegemonies intact (Charvet and Nay). Samuel Moyn’s demonstration of the Christian roots of human rights merely shifts the instrument of human rights formation from political constitutionalism to Christian ethos. In both cases, however, the Western origin of the rights concept belies its alleged universality. Donnelly’s influential work engages in intellectual gymnastics to find a plausible basis for universal human rights. But even this work admits that despite all, people must live in determined polities or they would find themselves in a Hobbesian state of nature, and that in the end states have human rights responsibilities only to their own citizens and territorial residents (Donnelly 30–32).

Clearly, only global citizenship could address all of these difficulties, and there has been considerable work done on developing that idea. Robert Paehlke seeks the basis for global citizenship in the movements to limit corporate depravity and U.S. militarism worldwide, hoping ironically that the opposition to the current global governance regime will provide that same regime with a stronger basis for legitimacy (Paehlk 15, 200–02). Andrew Moravcsik instead argues that democratic republican governments have often accepted the limitations on sovereignty imposed by international human rights regimes when the gains in reducing domestic political uncertainty—the risk of having a domestic opposition reverse preferred policies—outweigh that compromise (Moravcsik 217–52). Efforts at conceptualizing a “global democracy” are perpetually challenged by the lack of any global, or even international, or even European demos or people (Held 220). Aristotle’s criteria continue to matter in the twenty-first century. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that even under the most global of human rights regimes, rights remain inextricably tied to domestic politics and national governments. If there is a role for civil society and popular social movements, their impact must be primarily at the national level, and be differentiated in that impact in different countries and political communities. To be effective beyond national boundaries, they must act in concrete ways in solidarity with brother and sister movements and struggles or with efforts to bring about analogous gains to those already won or being fought for in each other’s national political communities. This means that the struggles, acts of solidarity, and discourses of movements from the pre-globalization era, especially from the immediately preceding era of anti-colonial and analogous movements, are surprisingly relevant to addressing our problems today.

#### Treating nations as unitary is necessary for solid theorizations of IR ⁠— geopolitical motivations and authoritative nature means states are unique

Lake 7, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego (David A. Lake, 6-28-2007, “The State and International Relations,” UC San Diego, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1004423)

All theories are based on simplifying assumptions intended to render a complex reality explicable. Theories are typically grouped into families or paradigms by their shared assumptions. 1 In making simplifying assumptions, analysts place a methodological “bet” on the most useful way to capture the essence of the phenomenon they wish to explain. These are bets because the assumptions must be made before the implications of the theory are fully worked out and tested.2 Scholars can work for years or possibly generations building from a set of assumptions before they know whether their bet will pay off by providing a powerful explanation of the desired phenomenon. State-centric theories of international relations assume that states are the primary actors in world politics. Theorists working in this tradition do not deny the existence of other political actors. As Kenneth Waltz (1979, 93-94) writes, “states are not and never have been the only international actors….The importance of nonstate actors and the extent of transnational activities are obvious.” Rather, the claim is that states, and especially great powers, are sufficiently important actors that any positive theory of international relation must place them at its core. Scholars making this assumption are betting that a focus on states will yield parsimonious yet empirically powerful explanations of world politics. Central to this bet is a hunch that the parsimony or theoretical elegance derived from an emphasis on states will outweigh the loss in empirical richness that comes from including a broader range of actors. One’s evaluation of state-centric theory rests, in part, on how one assesses the inevitable tradeoff between empirical power and theoretical elegance. This is a subjective choice over which reasonable scholars can disagree. In addition to parsimony, there are at least two additional reasons why some scholars expect state-centric theory to be a good bet. States may possess, or be plausibly understood to possess, a national interest in which society has relatively homogenous policy preferences. If so, analysts can safely abstract from the pushing and hauling of domestic politics and assume the state is a unitary entity interacting with other similarly unity entities. In realist theories, the national interest is assumed to be state power (Morgenthau 1978) and in neorealist theories it is assumed to be state survival, at a minimum, or power, at a maximum (Waltz 1979). Survival is understood as a primordial goal that is necessary for the pursuit of all others political ends. The drive for power stems from human nature (Morgenthau 1978, 36-38) or the state of nature that characterizes the international system (Mearsheimer 2001, 32-36), but in either case it is instrumental for achieving other ends within the political arena. Since survival or power occurs at the level of the nation or society, these assumptions about the goals of politics lead to the further assumption that states are the appropriate unit of analysis in theories of world politics. Other theories posit more context-specific national interests. Nuclear deterrence theory, not implausibly, presumes that everyone wants to avoid nuclear annihilation. Likewise, we can posit that nearly everyone benefits from freedom of the seas or stopping terrorism. When it seems reasonable to posit that citizens possess relatively homogenous interests, it can then be a convenient analytic shortcut to treat the state as a unitary actor. As sovereign entities, states possess ultimate or final authority over delimited territories and their inhabitants. Once a policy is enacted, the decision is binding on all citizens. If a state raises a tariff, all of its citizens are affected by the higher price for imports whether they support the tax or not. Just as states pass laws that bind their citizens at home, they also act authoritatively in ways that bind their own citizens in relations with other states. This is the analytic foundation of adage that “politics stops at the water’s edge.” Given their internal hierarchy, it is again reasonable to treat states as unitary actors when interacting with other similarly hierarchical states. A key assumption of Westphalian sovereignty is that authority is indivisible and culminates in a single apex (Hinsley 1986, 26Krasner 1999, 11). Whether sovereignty is vested in a hereditary monarch or the people, there is an ultimate or final authority within each state. This is not to assert that states possess the ability to regulate all the possible behaviors of all citizens (see below), only that there is a single point where, in President Harry Truman’s classic phrase, “the buck stops.” States may, of course, differ in how they aggregate the interests of their citizens. In autocratic regimes, a small group of elites may set policy for all. In more democratic states, representative institutions incorporate the interests of voters into policy. But regardless of what type of regime exists, citizens are bound by the policies enacted by their governments. It is this ability to act on behalf of their societies that make[s] states virtually unique in international relations. However active a[n] non-governmental organization may be, it can only claim to speak for its members and, perhaps, for universal principles such as justice or human rights: it cannot bind others through its actions, including its own members who join only in voluntary association. Because of their unique status as authoritative actors, and their ability to act on behalf of their citizens, it follows that states are central, 5 more important actors than others, and thus sometimes appropriate units of analysis in international politics.

### 1NC---AT: Method

#### The 1ac fails and re-inscribes power hierarchies

Dhawan 13, junior professor of political science for gender/postcolonial studies at Goethe University (Nikita Dhawan, Fall/Winter 2013, “Coercive Cosmopolitanism and Impossible Solidarities,” Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences Volume 22, Number 1)

Although Nussbaum and Beck enthusiastically endorse cosmopolitanism as a “solution” for past injustices and a “promise” of better times to come, I want to emphasize the complicities between liberal cosmopolitan articulations of solidarity and the global structures of domination they claim to resist. Pheng Cheah argues that such a critique of cosmopolitanism’s elitist detachment is motivated by a vision of cosmopolitanism as an “intellectual ethos” espoused by a “select clerisy” lacking feasible political structures for the universal institutionalization of its ideals.10 But I object to the project of cosmopolitanism, because it fails to seriously address the historical processes through which certain individuals are placed in a situation from which they can aspire to global solidarity and universal benevolence—in other words, it lacks a concept of cosmopolitanism as the self-indulgence of the altruistic and the magnanimous. Nussbaum, to her credit, is trying to explore ways of improving people’s lives. But that itself is the problem. Her attempt to act in the interests of distant others, to look beyond her position and make everyone have as good a life as “ours,” disregards the connection between the well-off “here” and the impoverished “elsewhere.” As Spivak has argued, Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism appears profoundly provincial, in its too-hasty assumption, as “given,” that a “first-world” metropolitan academic and a “third-world” sexed subaltern subject would share fundamental aims and interests.11 Nussbaum firmly believes in a critical Socratic pedagogy12 that would circumvent Eurocentrism through cultivating sensitivity [End Page 144] to other cultures and perspectives, even as she asserts that she “would rather risk charges of imperialism than refuse to take a moral stand on urgent issues facing women” (wcd, 2). In contrast to Nussbaum’s faith in cosmopolitanism’s self-correctional reflexivity, Spivak diagnoses in the cosmopolitan call to align ourselves with our fellow citizens a shift from “the white man’s burden” to the “the burden of the fittest.”13 This revision of social Darwinism defines the “unfit” as unable either to help or to govern themselves. The distance between those who “dispense” justice, aid, rights, and solidarity and those who are simply coded as “victims of wrongs” and thus as “receivers” remains a signature of historical violence (oa, 266n14). When progressive activists and intellectuals intervene “benevolently” in the struggles of subaltern groups for greater recognition and rights, they reinforce the very power relations that they seek to demolish. Conversely, Beck proposes that our common vulnerability in the face of risk brings us together. But as we all know, though we might be facing the same storm, we are not all in the same boat, and that makes all the difference. For Beck, the tsunamis resulted in the “globalization of compassion”; but, as an instructive contrast, I would like to consider a moment in Spivak’s narrative of a major cyclone in Bangladesh in 1991 and the subsequent intervention by Médecins sans frontières. The msf workers, none of whom spoke the local language, were obliged to work through interpreters. When Spivak later arrived at one of the villages where she had worked actively in the past, some of the villagers ran up to her, saying, “We don’t want to be saved, we want to die, they are treating us like animals.”14 In a situation like this, and without any common language, can we even think of solidarity? For these reasons, the Sri Lankan feminist Malathi De Alwis15 has asked if we are truly capable of empathizing with the pain of others, and even if we should be allowed to witness their pain if this witnessing only serves to affirm our humanity and our capacity to care. Correspondingly, of course, we need to find “authentic victims” who truly deserve our benevolence. What do we do with our “will to empower” the “disenfranchised and the vulnerable,” and how do we deal with those who refuse to be interpellated as appropriate objects of our solidarity? Inderpal Grewal proposes that contemporary cosmopolitanism is an outcome of two fundamental and inextricable concepts, namely, the liberal subject as a possessor of rights and as the subject of international trade.16 The former emerges from the Kantian notion of “the world citizen” as a subject of rights on a transnational scale, itself deeply linked to the subject of global economic exchange and trade. Grewal points out that, even as these two cannot exist without each other, the link between the two is conveniently obliterated in celebratory discourses about cosmopolitanism. Along similar lines, Cheah asks whether the international division of labor is the unacknowledged but necessary condition of new cosmopolitanisms (“c,” 495). This erasure is crucial to the production of cosmopolitan subjects in late capitalism. Historically, the cosmopolite, one who rises above narrow group loyalty to altruistically embrace the larger world, was marked as European, bourgeois, elite, and male. Discourses of new cosmopolitanism seek to rewrite this script by articulating the cosmopolitan within localized settings, creating rooted, vernacular, and lived cosmopolitanisms, arguing that contemporary transnationalism furnishes the material conditions for such new radical cosmopolitanisms that can regulate the excesses of capitalist globalization from below. The question remains whether these vernacular cosmopolitanisms genuinely enable those who were previously exiled from the public sphere tobe heard. New cosmopolitanisms are caught between a politics that advocates the virtues of postcolonial, cosmopolitan democracy and a kind of managerial internationalism and global moral entrepreneurship wherein those who claim to have listened to and heard the subaltern speak do not even share a common language with her.

#### Rupturing IR fails---demanding change without explaining concrete IR fixes reifies

Hom 18, PhD Professor of IR at Edinburg (Andrew R. Hom, 2018, “Silent Order: the Temporal Turn in Critical International Relations,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 46.3)

The Rapture of Rupture Uninhabitable, defined by its other, conflating novel with better, and unavoidably positional – in spite of these tensions rupture enjoys a prominent place in the critical discourse of time. How, then, does it actually work in that discourse? What explains its theoretical punch? I think the answer is a deeply embedded liberal-idealism. To be clear, this is not the neoliberalism of late modernity or the Kantian triad of democracy, interdependence, and multilateralism.182 Rather, rupture recalls the classic liberal commitment to the value and rights of the individual and the consequent responsibilities of sovereign states.183 Nor is it idealist in an ideational or strictly philosophical sense. Rather, I refer to a tendency to abstract ethical aspirations into theoretical assumptions while ignoring the concrete realities of political power, indeterminacy, and unintended consequences.184 Without substantive content, these notions appear relevant to most situations but offer little practical traction because all the heavy lifting is done by assumptions, abstractions, or productive silences. In the case of critical IR, we might think of this liberal-idealism as the rapture of rupture. First, the liberalism embedded in rupture. Critical scholars declare a commitment only to the ‘politics … [of] an active process of drawing and experimenting with lines, without having any preestablished lines – of history, society, and the world – to fall back on’.185 This springs from their fear of ‘reinforcing practices of security and violent forms of response’.186 But why should we eschew security practices and violence – two august aspects of politics – unless we build on some preestablished lines authorising the importance of human individuals and viewing the state as a threat rather than a security provider and/or realisation of collective will? Other critical scholars draw these lines from the ‘politically affirmative and progressive nature of deconstructive thought, as revealed through its onto-political character’,187 which acknowledges a commitment to choosing a which among many possible whats. This sort of progressivism wordlessly underwrites claims that in ruptures wake, ‘the only guiding principle is that of multiplicity itself’, which prioritises ‘difference’ and ‘singularity’ but presumably not different violence or singular evil.188 Moreover, it gives proposals to experiment with ‘more productive and creative’ approaches the gloss of self-sufficiency by orienting us toward welcome possibilities rather than novel forms of depredation. In these ways, times of rupture depend on classically liberal sensibilities, where the intrinsic value of human individuals makes it important to speak for the powerless, the marginalised, the non-elite and the ‘professionals of nothing’.189 This is entirely consistent with the earlier point that every temporality reflects particular purposes and works according to specific standards of reference. Critical scholars acknowledge this partway, noting that experimentation ‘can be said to express a particular ethics of the event, an ethics of trying to encounter the ambiguities and uncertainties of the pure event in a more productive and creative way’.190 Yet as an ethics, this involves some aspect of reconstruction, just as any critique implies or begs a substantive vision of an alternate future.191 However, such liberal and ethical impulses create tensions in times of rupture. As one liberal theorist notes, liberalism makes little sense ‘as an arena for the unfettered expression of “difference”’; its distinctiveness ‘lies not in the absence but, rather, in the content of its public purposes’ and how they privilege individuals and diversity.192 This is not multiplicity and possibility as such but rather from ‘a view of the human good that favours certain ways of life and tilts against others’.193 Without that ‘tilt’, experimenting with times of rupture becomes ‘a circular exercise, repeated for itself but with no effect, no life force, and no bite beyond the choir to whom it preaches’.194 Or worse, it opens room for novel forms of harm. This is where idealism becomes crucial to ruptured times. As various champions insist, rupture concerns only an engagement with possibility, thinking about what another politics might require to open up genuine alternatives. Even though other political agents are busy ‘recompos[ing] and reassert[ing]’ interpretive frameworks in rupture’s wake,195 critical advocates are unwilling to ‘subordinate the mysteries of time to specific notions of historical change’.196 Like other engagements with, say, protest cultures, there is a palpable ‘optimism for change’ here; one ‘rooted squarely in [the] refusal to describe what form a newly imagined politics might take’ and thus ‘defined only by its unconventionality’. 197 Novelty and possibility as such only resonate as preferable if we assume they encourage spontaneous improvement by virtue of their ‘extra-discursive’ or ‘natural state, a kind of protean fecundity that exists in idealised form in isolation from politics as it is usually lived’.198 Moreover, this frames violence and subordination as intrinsically old and positive pluralism as resolutely new. Ironically, then, given critical scholars’ resistance to imagined ‘temporal borders’ and avowed interest in ‘a radical critique of the contingent “ground(ing)”’ of modernity,199 the value of rupture depends upon a thoroughly modern form of temporal delineation. These silent assumptions and hidden logics help ‘characterize’ and thus ‘control’ times of rupture,200 transforming it from a description of traumatic and unlivable conditions to the foundation of a novel ethics that insists we ‘remain with uncertainty’ and ‘hope that something different’ will emerge.201 They are what take us from difference itself to a future ‘deemed worthy of being aspired towards’.202 They thus obscure the need to make alternatives tangible, which is vital for critique’s sake and for the everyday politics of individuals who do not enjoy the privilege of remaining in sheer contingency and indeterminacy.203 And they inhibit any evaluation of ruptured time as a ‘practical question’ of what it actually ‘does’, its ‘effects’, and how it works.204 To drive this point home, recall an earlier vision of novelty and difference tinged by tragedy. Hannah Arendt embraced ‘natality’ as moments of pure possibility but insisted these be tempered by a political sensitivity to potentially catastrophic unintended consequences. Each birth, in her formulation, is ‘uniquely new’ but includes no guarantees – ‘authentic’ novelty might be ‘all-destructive’.205 Ignoring these implications depoliticises and gentrifies novelty and leaves us poorly prepared to resist depredation when it (re-) emerges.206 Only by ignoring or sublimating the heavy lifting can critical scholars pass over a ‘rainbow bridge’ 207 of sorts that turns the start of the political problem – radical change – into the self-sufficient conclusion of ‘another politics’, which occludes the need to reduce contingency while avoiding catastrophe. So while deeply suspicious of promises to ‘take us from here to there’ or move us from past through present toward a better future,208 the critical discourse of rupture works – like the rapture itself – on the assumption ‘of being carried onward or swept along’ by ‘forces of movement’ that emerge independent of conscious effort.209 The rapture of rupture thus marks a missed opportunity, beginning with a legitimately ‘different perspective on time and politics’210 but producing a concept with ‘little relevance to life’211 because it demurs at precisely the point when it becomes necessary to lean on the scales, to encourage this time (or these times) instead of that and thereby privilege some purposes and politics over others. Ruptures are golden opportunities to develop another, better or less awful politics – as such they require more than hope, nebulous experimentation,212 or the refusal to say any more than ‘what I think it does for me’.213 Unless we think novel harms impossible and better outcomes naturally assured, ruptures mark a moment when it is vital to wilfully construct or at least reflexively delimit political time anew.214(324-8)

#### Hold a high threshold for solvency ⁠— it must specify how the world ought to function, otherwise it’s a bunk project

Tatum 18 , Assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Geography at Francis Marion University (Dillon Tatum, 11-28-2018, “Toward a Radical IR,” Duck of Minerva, <http://duckofminerva.com/2018/11/toward-a-radical-ir.html>)

David Brook’s latest column in the New York Times, banging on the same themes about “the kids are just not right,” raises some questions about what it means to engage in radical politics in the Trump era. Brooks compares the younger generation’s belief “that the system itself is rotten and needs to be torn down” to accomodationist and gradualisms. He continues on to speculate about how these new attitudes might affect older, more “pragmatic,” liberals who desire to work within the system. Brooks, as usual, uses a conservative argument to position himself in the “middle.” I have been thinking a lot about this issue of “radicalism” contra arguments about working within systems that are unjust in thinking about liberal world order and its futures. It has led me to a question I am currently exploring in a work-in-progress about what the possibilities are of radicalism as a way of approaching international politics. Against arguments like Brooks’, and even more sophisticated arguments about agonistic democracy developed by thinkers like Chantal Mouffe, I think there is a place in IR for radical conceptions of transformation, order, and politics. What is radicalism? Brooks never fully fleshes out this concept. Philosophy and political theory have engaged with the issue of radicalism as a concept, though the results are often divergent. To quote Agnes Heller, in her treatise on radical philosophy, it “can give the world a norm, and it can will people to want to give a world to the norm.” Radicalism as an idea, and as a form of critique, mobilizes many different modes of thinking about the social and the political. The most comprehensive definition of radicalism is that provided by Paul McLaughlin, who defines radicalism “in terms of (i) a fundamental orientation (toward fundamental objects) (ii) in the political domain (iii) of an argumentative nature.” More than that, though, we can add that radicalism intervenes in the political domain with the goal of fundamental transformation. Additionally, though radicalism indeed proceeds in an argumentative nature, this methodology for argument is one that is aimed at critiquing, and seeking the destruction/replacement of existing institutions. A revised working definition of radicalism, therefore, is: a way of thinking about politics that focuses on totalities, praxis and political action, and the deployment of historicist methods with an eye toward “getting to the root of things.” Thus, radicalism is both a broad range of critical thought and practice, but also is specific in the realms of focus, action, and method. If Brooks is right that there is a major clash between a radical younger generation and a more pragmatic and moderate older generation in American politics, these differences are not well expressed in contemporary thinking about IR. Some of the biggest divisions are between what Robert Cox called “problem-solving theories” and theories that critique such approaches, but provide little argumentation aimed at tearing structures of injustice down altogether. In short: IR, even at its critical ends, is not radical (for an excellent exception see here and here). Why is this important? This morning, I taught a seminar on the question “Is Liberal World Order Finished?” I asked my students to think about what makes a liberal order “liberal,” and then asked: “Can we fix the liberal world order, or can we imagine a world without it?—and what would that look like?” The students were quick to point out the violences, inequities, and problems inherent in a liberal world order, but it took a good bit of pushing and prodding to get them to articulate whether/how we should/could take this order apart and rethink it. This was not just a difficult task for the students—it is something IR has not spent enough time meditating on. There is a lot to be critical of these days. And, I disagree with Brooks’s pessimism about a younger radical generation. Politics is deeply intertwined with engagements with radicalism. What I think is missing when we consider global politics, though, is that many of our pressing questions about institutions, order, and state action proceed from the same sort of moderation, accomodationism, or—at the most—an immanently critical vein. If we want to intellectually and politically approach issues like: What do we make of the future(s) of liberal world order? IR needs to engage with radicalism.

### 1NC---AT: Nationalism

#### Methodological nationalism doesn’t correlate with changes to social policy

Frödin 13, lecturer at the Department of Sociology, Lund University (Olle Frödin, 2013, “Political order and the challenge of governance: moving beyond the nationalism-cosmopolitanism debate,” Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory Volume 14, Issue 1, pp. 65-79)

This suggests that there is no immediate link between emotionalized bonds of solidarity to an imagined community and the existence of institutions ensuring redistributive policies and other formal social protection measures. Moreover, people have multiple identities and may have emotionalized bonds of solidarity and moral obligations in relation to a wide range of different groups and communities. For instance, people may belong to communities constructed on the basis of place, kinship, religious beliefs, sexual orientations, occupations, ethnicity, and so on. Since people have multiple identities, the crucial question with regard to the governance of large-scale collectivities is not one of national versus other loyalties, but how different identities linked to different interests and/or different forms of solidarity and social obligations have been, and can be, brought in accord with each other, so as to form stable and legitimate political orders.

#### The aff can’t get rid of nationalism or the state

Stephen M. Walt 19, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, 6/4/19, “You Can’t Defeat Nationalism, So Stop Trying”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/04/you-cant-defeat-nationalism-so-stop-trying/

Nothing has happened since then to alter my views; if anything, the importance of understanding the power of nationalism is even greater today. It was nationalism—specifically, a desire to regain lost national autonomy—that drove the British decision to leave the European Union, even though the movement’s leaders (and I use that term advisedly) cannot figure out how to do it and departure is likely to make most Britons poorer and could lead to the eventual dissolution of the entire United Kingdom. U.S. President Donald Trump rode nationalist nostalgia for an imagined past (“Make America Great Again”) to the White House in 2016, and it forms the basis for the protectionist and anti-immigrant policies that keep his political base loyal now. Nationalism is central to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitious efforts to make China a world leader, and it is the common thread uniting right-wing European politicians in France, Austria, Italy, Hungary, and Poland. Everywhere one looks, in fact, one sees nationalism at work in today’s world.

Why is nationalism so powerful, and why is its impact so important?

For starters, humans are social beings. From the moment we are born, we belong to some sort of community—a family, a tribe, a village, a province, and, today, a country. Because we depend on those around us from the very beginning, humans have evolved to be highly sensitive to in-group/out-group distinctions. Being able to identify friends and foes quickly was once critical for survival, and it is cognitively easier to rely on simple indicators (“she speaks my language”; “he looks different than my group”) than conducting an in-depth assessment of someone else’s character or propensities. Given these evolutionary imperatives, it is hardly surprising that humans are probably more sensitive to such distinctions than we ought to be. This is not to say we cannot see beyond our own tribes and forge powerful attachments to others, or that we cannot redefine who is “in” or “out” over time; it is merely to say that we have a strong propensity to identify more strongly with those we regard as being “like us.”

Thus far, the “nation” has been the largest cultural group with this sort of enduring attraction for its members. The defining traits that make up a nation can vary, but they usually include a common language, shared culture, a territorial origin, and a shared narrative about the collective past. Most importantly, a nation is a group of people that conceives of itself as constituting a unique community with a particular identity. In Benedict Anderson’s famous phrase, nations are “imagined communities” where total strangers nonetheless recognize and acknowledge each other as belonging to the same group.

Moreover, as John Mearsheimer points out in his recent book The Great Delusion, the power of nationalism rests in part on its symbiotic relationship with the state. Given the competitive pressures inherent in a world with no central authority, states have powerful incentives to encourage national unity within their borders, so that citizens are loyal and more willing to sacrifice for the state when necessary. Promoting nationalism—and especially a common language—also helped create more unified national economies and more productive populations, thereby enhancing the state’s overall capacity.

Similarly, because national groups that lack their own state are more vulnerable to conquest, absorption, persecution, or assimilation, many nations decided that having a state of their own was the best way to ensure their survival as an independent cultural group. The unfortunate histories of the Kurds, Palestinians, Tamils, and many others shows what can happen when a national group’s aspirations to statehood are repeatedly thwarted.In the modern world, in short, nations want their own states to ensure their survival and autonomy, while states promote nationalism to strengthen themselves and preserve their independence. Nationalist movements hope to add themselves to the ranks of U.N. members, while states do what they can to suppress independence movements within their borders and to create a homogeneous body of loyal citizens. In extreme cases, minorities are expelled, slaughtered, or “re-educated” (as China is now trying to do to the Uighur population in Xinjiang) in an effort to create a more unified (and presumably loyal) population.Taken together, these twin imperatives help explain why nationalism remains such a powerful and persistent force. And make no mistake: Its impact is profound. Even overly educated and generally skeptical individuals (e.g., me) are hardly immune to its effects. Why do I bemoan the absence of American men among the ranks of the world’s top tennis players? Why do I root for the American team at the men’s and women’s World Cup? Not because I know any of these athletes personally and happen to like them or admire their individual virtues; for all I know, they might be undeserving jerks. No, I’m rooting for them solely because they’re American. Although I think of myself as fairly cosmopolitan in outlook and wise to the seductive appeal of national pride, I can’t escape it entirely.Why should we care about this powerful and enduring phenomenon? First, because national sentiment is easily exploited by political leaders, including most of the demagogues whose activities are currently roiling politics around the world. By wrapping themselves in the mantle of patriotism, and constantly warning about the foreigners that are supposedly threatening our way of life, would-be authoritarians such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban or cynical opportunists such as Boris Johnson can convince supporters that they are the only defense against national decline or even extinction.Second, nationalist narratives encourage double standards: They rationalize whatever one’s own side does while depicting similar behavior by others in the worst possible light. Americans condemn President Vladimir Putin’s Russia for its actions in Ukraine (and they are certainly worthy of condemnation), but we forget that we’ve done plenty of similar things in the past. It is more than a little ironic, for example, when the same people who loudly demanded that the United States invade Iraq in 2003 (on the basis of dubious arguments and manufactured “evidence”) were quick to attack Russia for its interference in Ukraine. Can you spell “hypocrisy”? Similarly, U.S. officials like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo routinely portray Iran as a relentless aggressor, blithely ignoring all the moments when the United States has used its vastly greater military powers to interfere in states that had done nothing to attack us. Mind you, I’m not defending Russian or Iranian conduct; I’m just showing how nationalist blinders make it harder to see what is really going on.Third, nationalism can get in the way of potential political compromises, especially when supposedly sacred national territory is involved. There was no rational reason for Serbia to try to retain Kosovo back in 1999 (the local population was overwhelmingly made up of hostile Kosovars and the region itself was of no great strategic or economic value), but Belgrade could not let it go because it was the cradle of Serbian national identity. Similarly, the inability of contemporary states to solve lingering territorial disputes (whether in Kashmir, the East China Sea, the Sakhalin Islands, or wherever) owes much to the power of national feeling. Not so very long ago, states ceded or sold territory when it made strategic or financial sense for them to do so, and they usually did it without much controversy. (The United States got the Louisiana Purchase from France and Alaska from Russia in just this way, for example). Today, such actions are almost unheard-of, because nationalized populations resist giving up anything that is seen as part of the country’s sacred territory.Relatedly, nationalism makes cross-border empathy and understanding more elusive. Because all nations sanitize their own history, downplaying or denying their past transgressions and portraying their own actions as consistently noble and benevolent, they frequently won’t remember harms they have done to others. If they do remember it, it will be in a sugar-coated and self-serving form. As a result, subsequent generations won’t understand why others might have a very different view of the past, and thus a different view of the first state’s motivations and character. In some cases, of course, this phenomenon may be present in both countries and make the level of mutual misunderstanding even greater. The result: Each side won’t fully grasp why the other has good reason to be wary or suspicious, and each will be prone to interpret prudent defensive behavior as evidence of irrevocably malign intent. One need only consider the stubbornly toxic relationship between the United States and Iran to see how powerful and enduring such dynamics can be.Fourth, nationalism has long been a potential source of overconfidence, because most (all?) national myths include subtle or not-so-subtle claims to superiority. Not only is our nation different from all others, we are taught, it is also better. Nationalism is hard to separate from national pride, and pride makes it harder to believe that outsiders could ever beat us in a fair fight. This tendency doesn’t mean that every tiny David thinks he can beat mighty Goliath (i.e., even proud nations sometimes recognize when the balance of power is stacked against them), but can still lead to arrogance and wishful thinking. It is no accident, I suspect, that die-hard Brexiteers believe leaving the EU will both restore British autonomy (yes) and usher in a new era of British prosperity and greatness (no). Brexit proponents may have known such claims were dubious and used them for for purely cynical reasons, but the blatant appeal to national pride made audiences more likely to accept them.Nationalism is not without its virtues, of course. Convincing individuals to make sacrifices for the common good is not a bad thing, and a healthy degree of political unity and pride in a country’s genuine accomplishments is surely preferable to the rancorous, open-ended struggles that divide many democracies today. Binational or multinational states without a tradition of assimilation do not have an inviting history, and efforts to grant autonomy to every self-identifying nation inside a country would probably lead to ruinous levels of dysfunction and eventual dissolution.

In any case, nationalism ain’t going away. The challenge, therefore, is to acknowledge its value and limit its vices. That is, of course, easier said than done. At the very least, its power and persistence needs to be recognized and respected. Among other things, a healthy respect for nationalism’s power would discourage powerful states from thinking they can remake the world according to their own particular designs, and help us avoid the hubristic fantasies that have caused so much harm in recent years. We live in a world of bristling nationalisms, that’s not going to change anytime soon, and acknowledging that is a good basis on which to construct a more realistic foreign policy.

#### Nationalism is redeemable and good.

Forlenza, 20—fellow at the Remarque Institute, New York University and at Potsdam University’s Center for Citizenship, Social Pluralism, and Religious Diversity (Rosario, “Nation as Home: Anthropological Foundations and Human Needs,” *Bringing the Nation Back In: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and the Struggle to Define a New Politics*, Chapter 9, pg 176-177, dml)

This paper has argued that dominant political theory and social science analysis of nations and nationalism are blind to the crucial question of background experiences, or the latent and hidden experiential and anthropological practices that take for granted the reference point of human life, the experience of home. To have a home or share an experience of home is the solid and basic necessary basis for human life (for any human life) to have a meaning.

Nations and nationalism must be understood as the translation of the need to have a home—or to share the experience of home—into a larger political entity, a participation in a broader cosmic entity, and the creation of political allegiance under conditions of existential uncertainty. Intellectuals and observers do not usually understand that nationalism has been such a powerful phenomenon precisely because it is based on the endless revaluation and symbolization of the nation-state as home, which cannot be simply overcome with the cosmopolitan paradigm of taking the world as home.

Historical experiences show that the anthropological need to share a home can crystallize in political revolution and war and become the master narrative of nationalism that blossoms into a fully developed, violent, and exclusionary doctrine. However, this process of abstraction is by no means unidirectional, and highly elaborated nationalism can open to a healthier sense of the nation as home. After all, although nationalism has not often proved to be great at creating multiethnic coalitions, specific egalitarian redistributive politics have historically been correlated with national projects. In short, the nation can be based on recognition and familiarity—an important term for all its banality. The nation in this sense can exclude abstraction, alienation, and violence aggressively pitched against the other/ the enemies. Boundaries and borders between “homes” can re-unify common things between individuals and communities. Or, to put differently, there are not common things to share without boundaries and borders.

Membership in a cosmopolitan world produces a weak form of identity and an ideological-legalistic construct, which cannot serve as the basis of commonalities, shared identities, and meaningful political communities—all of which are necessary to address the tearing of the world. A meaningful, stable political allegiance must engage peoples’ energies and values by drawing forth the existential dimension of human beings and their experience of home as expressed in cultural and anthropological practices rooted in localizing processes.

#### Institutions are sustainable---no structural collapse.

Carlsson-Szlezak 20, \*[Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak](https://hbr.org/search?term=philipp%20carlsson-szlezak&search_type=search-all) is a partner and managing director in BCG’s New York office and global chief economist of BCG; \*[Martin Reeves](https://hbr.org/search?term=martin%20reeves&search_type=search-all) is the chairman of Boston Consulting Group’s BCG Henderson Institute in San Francisco and a coauthor of [The Imagination Machine](https://www.amazon.com/Imagination-Machine-Create-Companys-Future/dp/1647820863/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=Martin+Reeves%2C+The+Imagination+Machine&qid=1596553141&s=books&sr=1-1) (Harvard Business Review Press, 2021); \*[Paul Swartz](https://hbr.org/search?term=paul%20swartz&search_type=search-all) is a director and senior economist in the BCG Henderson Institute, based in BCG’s New York office; (“The U.S. Is Not Headed Toward a New Great Depression”, https://hbr.org/2020/05/the-u-s-is-not-headed-toward-a-new-great-depression)

Why the U.S. Is Unlikely to be Headed Towards a Structural Regime Break Though the path from the crisis we’re in now to either depression or debt crisis is not impossible, it’s not easy or natural, if we examine each of the four paths in regards to the current situation: Policy Error — The policy challenge of coronavirus is enormous, but what is on display is the opposite of the inaction of the Great Depression. On the monetary side, the first signs of stress in the banking system — in the repo and commercial paper markets — were met with timely and sizable monetary policy action. On the fiscal side, it didn’t take long — certainly by Washington standards — to pass the $2 trillion CARES Act to provide funds to counteract the wave of liquidity and capital problems for the real economy (households and firms). Beyond any specific policy action, we are seeing a mindset in which policy makers will keep throwing policy innovations at the problem until something sticks — quite the opposite of the 1930s. Political Willingness — It certainly is possible that political calculus gets in the way of averting a structural breakdown, but not very plausible because the political costs are high. To be sure there are two risks involved: 1) The unwillingness to craft a piece of legislation, perhaps because of differences in analysis, beliefs, or dogma; and 2) the failure to pass legislation because one side sees greater political gain in obstruction. While the TARP fiasco reminds us that both risks are real and shouldn’t be dismissed, crises tend to lubricate deal making, and the costs of political obstruction are particularly high, even in a hyper-partisan election year. Policy Dependence — This path is not applicable in the U.S. because of monetary sovereignty. The Federal Reserve will always facilitate fiscal policy in a time of low and stable inflation and a healthy currency. Policy Rejection — A debt crisis seems improbable for the U.S.: Inflation expectations are very well anchored (and, if anything, too low). The rate-risk correlation is very solid, where in risk-off periods (moment when investors are less tolerant of risk and prices of risk assets like stocks fall) bond prices rally (yields fall). The USD reserve currency status is deeply entrenched as the rest of the world needs to hold U.S. safe assets (and don’t wish to see their currencies appreciate). And nominal interest rates are generally lower than nominal growth (r – g < 0). All of these factors make for favorable financing conditions. Can coronavirus damage all that and deliver a crisis where markets refuse to purchase U.S. debt? It’s possible, but very implausible, and it would be a long and painful process. A break in the inflation regime plays out over several years.

#### Studying war is more likely to de-securitize than justify violent intervention

Edelstein 10, PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor at Georgetown (David Edelstein, 2010, “Why realists don’t go for bombs and bullets,” Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/21/why-realists-dont-go-for-bombs-and-bullets/>)

Thanks to Steve Walt for inviting me to contribute to his blog while he is away on vacation. I have been a regular reader of Steve’s blog since it launched, and for my first post, I wanted to pick up on a motif that I have seen running through Steve’s posts: Will realists ever again support the use of military force by the United States? Followers of this blog will by now have little doubt about how Walt felt about the Iraq War or how he views the prospects for U.S. success in Afghanistan. In fact, throughout the history of his blog, I can only recall one case in which Walt advocated the use of U.S. military force (and I think the realist credentials in that case are rather dubious). There is a common perception in the field of political science that realists are war-mongering Neanderthals anxious to use military force at the drop of a hat. Attend any meeting (if you must) of the American Political Science Association or the International Studies Association, and one will find realists derided as the "bombs and bullets guys" as if we were all direct descendants of Curtis LeMay. What is notable about this — and what has been notable about Steve’s blog — is just how infrequently realists have supported the use of American military force. Take the U.S. interventions of the post-Cold War period: Panama, the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Of those interventions, Afghanistan was the only one that received anything close to strong support from most realists. Others, most notably the Iraq War, received vehement opposition from the vast majority of realists. Even in the case of Afghanistan, realists expressed trepidation about the prospects for ultimate success despite early victories. Go back to the Cold War, and realists like Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau were famously opposed to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Lest one think this is an academic phenomenon, realist policymakers like Brent Scowcroft were equally critical of the Bush administration’s actions in Iraq, and George F. Kennan was skeptical of the U.S. interventions in both Korea and Vietnam. Today, should anyone dare to suggest the use of military force in new contexts such as Iran, they are summarily dismissed by prominent realists. Not a single (self-proclaimed or attributed) realist I know of has advocated the use of military force against Iran in response to its apparent development of nuclear weapons, and most are adamantly opposed to it. From one perspective, this opposition is surprising. It is realists, after all, who so value material power, in particular military capabilities. It is not difficult to understand why so many would assume that realists are anxious to use military force because realists are anxious to focus on military capabilities as a primary explanatory variable for international politics. But it is precisely because realists have spent so much time studying military force that they are also so reluctant to use military force. Though realists themselves are divided on the question, many have concluded that the use of military force is often counterproductive, inviting balancing coalitions that simply make life more difficult. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, using military force to reorder societies is very difficult and unlikely to succeed except in uncommon circumstances.

#### Combining realism with other IR disciplines improves accuracy and prevents academic rigidity

Kaminski 19, International University of Sarajevo (Joseph Jon Kaminski, 2019, “Rethinking Realism and Constructivism Through the Lenses of Themes and Ontological Primary,” Croatian International Relations Review, XXV(85), pp. 6-29, DOI 10.2478/ cirr-2019-0004)

The European Journal of International Relations (EJIR) released a special issue in September 2013 (Vol. 19, Issue 3) titled, ‘The End of International Relations Theory?’ The individual articles that appeared in this highly touted volume generally argued that it was time for scholars to move beyond the old paradigm wars and instead embrace some type of integrative pluralism between competing paradigms. On the detrimental effect of the paradigm wars that dominated international relations (IR) theorising during the 1990’s and early part of the 2000’s, David Lake commented that these intellectual squabbles “perverted the discipline and turned inquiry into contests of a quasi-religious belief in the power of one or more ‘ism’” (2013: 568). Dunne, et al.’s opening article set the tone for the volume arguing for integrative pluralism, an approach to IR theorising which “accepts and preserves the validity of a wide range of theoretical perspectives and embraces theoretical diversity as a means of providing more comprehensive and multi-dimensional accounts of complex phenomena” (2013: 416). Integrative pluralism allows for scholars to incorporate concepts from multiple paradigms, ultimately creating new theories that can compensate for weaknesses in older theories. Meaningful IR theorising in the future will require a more complex understanding of reality which necessitates greater research on ontology, and most importantly— an idea that will be later explained in greater detail— the notion of ontological primacy. Thomas Kuhn (1962) argued that paradigms in the hard sciences are incommensurable; when one scientific theory comes into fashion, the old theory is promptly relegated into the annals of history. However, Kuhn’s theory about paradigm shifts was specifically aimed at the hard sciences and not necessarily the social sciences. Unlike physical scientists who completely abandon previous theories deemed inadequate, social scientists build on previous work. Andrew Bennett’s reading of Kuhn suggests that paradigmatic exclusivity should not be the way social science research operates. Instead, Bennett calls for his own version of pluralism within IR theorising, structural pluralism, arguing that “it conveys the sense that IR scholars can borrow the best ideas from different theoretical traditions and social science disciplines in ways that allow both intelligible discourse and cumulative progress” (2013: 461). Structural pluralism’s strongest point is that it allows for cumulative research findings within a discourse whose structure remains intact. Theoretical eclecticism has long been a staple in some of the other sub-fields in political science. For example, some of the leading Marxist scholars in comparative politics often incorporate elements of liberalism and even conservatism in their understanding of politics. Sheri Berman’s, Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century (2006), is an excellent contemporary example of a work that utilises elements of liberalism and Marxism to explain the development of social democracy in Europe during following WWII. Similar efforts at transcending hard paradigmatic boundaries have occurred more recently in foreign policy analysis as well. Hans Mouritzen argues that ‘compatibilism’ is the road forward in foreign policy analysis which he argues …holds that perspectives should — for explanatory purposes — be made compatible by the conscious effort of the analyst ‘Compatible’ means that they should be mutually competitive, possibly offering contradictory real-world predictions, but (in some cases) ultimately supplementing one another in a specific explanation. Even if forces are contradictory, they may both be at work in a given situation and thus ‘push’ actors and developments in opposite directions — the net result thus being a compromise. Therefore, the perspectives or theories should be allowed to supplement one another for explanatory purposes. (2017: 3) Asle Toje’s work on strategic culture in relation to EU actorness also embodies the integrative pluralist spirit. His work nicely weaves together realist concerns with hard power and constructivist interests in soft power and non-coercive persuasion noting that …instruments of foreign policy are usually grouped under the broad headings of diplomatic bargaining, persuasion, economic rewards and coercion, armed coercion and military intervention. Friendly states tend to interact at the lower end of this scale and adversaries tend towards the upper end” (2008: 12). The key point is that one cannot understand EU strategic culture without accounting for the interaction between power and identity. Even prior to the 2013 EJIR special edition, IR theorists had already begun to move away from strict paradigm demarcations. Solomon Barkin for example argued that the strict paradigm approach towards constructing theories of international relations should be avoided; rather concepts should be the key focus— “Paradigms stand in opposition to each other; to believe in one is to reject others. Concepts interact in more complicated ways” (2010: 6). Theories like constructivism, realism, and neorealism should not be viewed in all or nothing terms; they should instead be viewed as theories that place primacy on certain concepts or themes. While at times they truly are diametrically opposed, often there are points of convergence. This paper focuses on constructivism and realism and argues that both approaches often deal with the many of the same themes. Ted Hopf argued that “neorealism and constructivism share fundamental concerns with the role of structure in world politics, the effects of anarchy on state behavior, the definition of state interests, the nature of power, and the prospects for change” (1998: 181). However, these themes are engaged with from very different ontological perspectives. It is important to recognise that while neorealism and constructivism may share similar ‘fundamental concerns’ with these aforementioned themes, they do not necessarily share the same understanding of how to actually approach them, nor do they give the same level of explanatory power given to each of them. Similar to Hopf, Barkin has also advocated for the compatibility between constructivist and realist approaches to international relations— An examination of constructivist epistemology and classical realist theory suggests that they are, in fact, compatible. Not, of course, that good constructivism is necessarily realist, or that good realism is necessarily constructivist. But rather that constructivist research is as compatible with a realist worldview as with any other as (and more compatible with realism than some), and that the realist worldview in turn can benefit from constructivist research methods. (2010: 3) One ought not to force explanations that incorporate realism and constructivism into their work. Barkin’s main point throughout his work is that future IR research should occupy a middle ground between rigid paradigms and overly loose concepts. This resonates with the pioneering work of Giovanni Sartori (1970) who contended that good concepts find a balance between precision and extensibility. Sartori famously argued that future concept formation and theorisation ought “to maneuver, both up-wards and downwards, along a ladder of abstraction in such a way as to bring together assimilation and differentiation, a relatively high explanatory power and a relatively precise descriptive content, macro-theory and empirical testing” (1970: 1053). In essence, Sartori sought to define concepts in ways that would maximise Pareto optimality between precision and extensibility. Barkin applies this general basic logic to an IR context, arguing that “somewhere between a rigidly paradigmatic approach and an unordered conceptual free-forall is a level of categorisation that is amenable to productive communication among approaches” (2010: 6). To engage in productive communication, one must begin by looking at where the different methods share a similar discourse. As integrative pluralism gains further traction in IR theorising, the next question that must be addressed is: how can we move forward in theorising in a manner than allows for some flexibility between previously believed to be incommensurable paradigms (such as realism and constructivism), while at the same time, maintaining at least some boundaries to avoid annihilating the earlier paradigms altogether? This article will contend that themes and ontological primacy help to address this question. Future IR theorising ought to: 1) articulate the different themes they engage with, and; 2) articulate which matters are ontologically primary in their analyses. If this can be done, meaningful integrative pluralism that does not denigrate into a type of ‘theoryless theorising’ can transpire thus moving the discourse on IR theory forward. The next few sections of this article contend that the disagreement between realists and constructivists is primarily related to the degree in which one theory prioritises a particular concept or idea over another more than anything else.

Defining Ontological Primacy

Jackson and Nexon argue that disagreements between the various approaches to international relations theory ought to be understood in terms of ‘gradations of disagreement’ rather than ‘absolute, categorical distinctions’— …we believe that the state of theorizing might be improved if we focused more on the agreements and disagreements among choice-theoretic, experience-near, and socialrelational approaches. Such an understanding of the field reconstructs existing terms of debate, deals with broad concerns in scientific ontology, and involves gradations of disagreement rather than absolute, categorical distinctions. (2013: 560) This article supports this general position. Before looking at similar themes covered by constructivism and realism in greater detail, the notions of themes and ontological primacy need to first be more clearly defined. The word ‘theme’ has its origins in Greek, théma (θθμθ) and originally meant: “a proposition” or “subject.” Its Latin equivalent, thema, similarly means: “a subject” or “thesis.” A ‘theme’ in contemporary IR theory scholarship can be understood as a specific subject or topic studied within IR’s broader various competing discursive theoretical frameworks. There are many themes readily discussed in IR theory such as the anarchic international order, self-help behaviour, balance of power and balance of threat, the role of international norms, the role of language, and the role of domestic politics. Realism and constructivism both regularly engage with these themes. Exploring a particular theme in international relations however does not necessarily imply that the aforementioned theme is rudimentary, or has ontological primacy, in the broader discursive framework of any particular theoretical approach. Ontological primacy within IR theorising can be conceived of as a foundational understanding of what is considered indispensable or constitutive of a particular international relations theoretical discursive framework. The root of the word ‘ontology’ derives from the Greek word Latin word prīmātus which means: ‘of the first rank.’ Therefore, ontological primacy can be understood as a study of that which is of the first rank. One salient example of how constructivism and realism are ontologically different is in regard to their more general methodological approaches to international relations theorising. Realist/positivist approaches are often primarily interested in how power is exercised, whereas constructivist/ post-positivist theories usually tend to focus on how power is experienced. While there are always exceptions to the rule, realist theories tend to focus on the impact of material forces in a scientifically objective, value free way; they are generally positivist theories. John Mearsheimer’s, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) is an example of a work that is situated within a positivist-realist methodology. Such works do not make normative claims as to what ought to be done; they seek to simply explain the world as it is. Positivist theories often are critical of normative theories because these theories often blur the lines between facts and morality (Nicholson 1996). Positive theories are primarily interested in facts, not ethics. Constructivist theories on the other hand often tend to engage in post-positivist methodological frameworks that focus on ideational forces and socially constructed realities. Often such theories are normative and reject efforts to provide metanarratives that claim to explain the entire international system. Works like Kathryn Sikkink’s, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (2011), embody this normative constructivist spirit. The methodological and epistemological divide between the two approaches is real. Post-positivist constructivist theories are not studied in the same way as positivist realist theories. In many ways, the positivist–post-positivist divide overlaps with the epistemological and ontological differences of the second and final debates, respectively. Indeed, it reflects two different paradigms — not in the usual, loose International Relations sense that I have been using so far, but in the Kuhnian (Kuhn, 1970) definition of a single, hegemonic theoretical approach — in which ‘facts’ in one paradigm are sometimes simply unintelligible in the other. (Lake 2013: 578) Part of the earlier difficulties in creating a genuine dialogue between realism and constructivism could be traced back to the methodology and epistemology of each approach. Despite these genuine differences, each approach does not have to be so rigid that it cannot account for certain overlapping thematic concerns in its analysis such as power politics, anarchy, and ideas. There are major differences in the specific themes each approach posits as ontologically primary. For example, the role of anarchy and self-help is constructed as an independent reality in neorealist discourses. Regardless of social realities, anarchy and self-help behaviour have their own independent mode of action and impact on the international order. Anarchy and self-help behaviour are always ontologically primary themes in realism. This does not mean realism cannot also account for social and ideational factors in its analysis. It does mean that such themes will ultimately be secondary in explanatory power to anarchy and self-help behaviour. An anarchic world order is the cause of the various ideational forces that shape international relations. On the other hand, within constructivism, ideational forces and norms are the most ontologically primary variable to consider. Ideational forces account for why the international order is anarchic. The causal chain between anarchy and ideational forces within realism is turned around within constructivism; ideational forces are the cause and one of the effects is the anarchic international order. As such, anarchy cannot simply be studied as a given with no conditions attached to it. The next sections will look in greater detail at some of the themes that are shared by realism and constructivism and how both approach these same themes.

Theme 1: The Role of Identities and Power Politics

Realist and constructivist research have both addressed the role of identities and pure power politics. While each school’s approach to power politics and intersubjectivity at an ontological level are vastly different, this does not mean there is an irreconcilable gap between these two concepts at a thematic level. Terms such as ‘rules’, ‘norms’, and ‘discourses’ often immediately raise the constructivist flag. Barkin (2010) argues that while constructivism looks specifically at rules, norms, and discourses, none of these are only applicable to constructivism; any effective realist critique must at some level take these particular things into consideration as well. Identities are shared and constructed amongst actors. There are multiple ‘ideational factors’ that constantly shape and reshape these identities. According to Ruggie, “In contrast to neo-utilitarianism, constructivists contend that not only are identities and interests of actors socially constructed, but they also must share the stage with a whole host of ideational factors that emanate from the human capacity and will which Weber wrote about” (1998: 856). Ideational factors include, but are not limited to identities, threats, fears, general aspirations, and other rudiments of perceived reality (Lakitsch 2019). The interactions of these elements influence both state and nonstate actors within the broader international system. Questions about human nature, which are ultimately connected to identities, have always been relevant in realist thought going all the way back to Thucydides. For Thucydides, “with the ordinary conventions of civilized life thrown into confusion, human nature, always ready to offend even where law exists, showed itself in its true colours, as something incapable of controlling passion, insubordinate to the idea of justice, the enemy to anything superior to itself…” (Thucydides— cited in Sekine 1999: 136). The idea that specific identities shape international relations have been incorporated into realist approaches as well. Bennett for example comments that …scientific realism is open to theories on the kinds of mechanisms that constructivists emphasize, including theories of persuasion, intersubjective meanings, discursive communication, learning, naming and shaming, framing, legitimacy, and norms of appropriateness. (2013: 468) While issues of intersubjectivity might not be ontologically primary in realism, this does not mean intersubjectivity is an ‘out-of-bounds’ theme to consider within a realist theoretical framework. Critical constructivism understands social relations much like Foucault who saw hierarchy, subordination and domination as inextricable from all social interactions. This is quite similar to important assumptions held by realists and neorealists in regard to global politics (Hopf 1998). Realism and critical theory are intimately connected in many fundamental ways. The differentiating issue is degree, or ontological primacy, rather than actual content of the ideas being debated. In the 1940’s, E.H. Carr noted the interaction between power politics and intersubjectivity. He argued that the basis of international morality being founded on some type of ‘harmony of interests’ was wrong and that in the years following WWI, “every country struggled to maintain its expanded production; and an enhanced and inflamed national consciousness was invoked to justify the struggle” (1949: 61). He goes on to explicitly claim that the vindictiveness of the Treaty of Versailles directly facilitated in Hitler’s rise to power. This argument lacks any explanatory power without actually understanding the unique subjective conditions that lead to the rise of fascism. By Carr’s own admission, the draconian conditions set forth by the Treaty of Versailles set the table for Hitler’s rise. Its stipulations bankrupted Germany, thus putting Hitler in a position to spread his nationalist ideology to an already disenfranchised German public in the 1920’s. The treaty itself formalised the power structure between state actors in Europe following the Great War. A different treaty would have most likely meant a completely different international world order. Carr’s analysis is a great concrete example of thematic overlap between realism and constructivism. Carr’s assessment is dependent upon understanding how constructed identities were impacted by this treaty. Despite the overlap, Carr’s ontological assessment of international relations is still driven by power politics. While power politics is the ontologically primary concept in his overall analysis, nonetheless, intersubjectivity cannot be completely divorced from his analysis. When trying to actually understand what ‘power politics’ means, Barkin argues that it is meaningless unless placed into the context of other states and the behaviours and actions of states at some level contending that “it makes no sense to speak of the power of a state without the context of the object with respect to which of whom that power may be used” (2010: 18). When states grapple for power in the anarchic sea of international relations the ways the actual grappling occurs varies from state to state. Treaties, economic relationships, and cultural connections all impact and affect the way states actually struggle with each other for power. The response of the United States to a perceived violation of international law by a state like Iran or North Korea would obviously be substantially different than if a similar violation was carried out by a close ally like Canada or Israel. Understanding power is meaningless without having some idea of who the players in the actual game are and what their agendas are. Other realists have also discussed the importance of ideas and actors. Robert Gilpin recognised the dangers of ignoring individuals and individual interests when trying to understand the international order— “There is certainly the danger in this practice of coming to think of the state as an actor in its own right, which has interests separate from those of its constituent members” (1984: 318). Each state is at some level going to act differently in accord to prevailing historical circumstances. The specific people who are actually in power impact state behaviour at both the domestic and international level. Contemporary realists recognise that multiple factors influence state behaviour. The structure itself does have an impact on state behaviour. Realists differ from constructivists in the belief that state behaviour’s most important factor is security: this is an ontological distinction between realism and constructivism, not just a thematic one. However, both realists and constructivists posit that attitudes and personalities impact the international order. “Identities are necessary in international politics and domestic society alike, in order to ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order” (Hopf 1998: 174). Gilpin and Hopf both recognise that without considering the importance of identities, making reasonable predictions on behaviour is impossible.

Theme 2: Anarchy and Self-Help Behaviour

Another thematic similarity and ontological difference between realism and constructivism is the role of the anarchic world order, largely driven by self-help behaviour. Both theories address the question of anarchy in the international order. They both also have something to say about the nature of individual states self-help behaviour. As mentioned in my earlier discussion on realism, anarchy is an ontologically primary classical realist proposition (Carr 1949; Waltz 1979; Waltz 1986; Waltz 1986a). According to Morgenthau, “The state has become indeed a “mortal God,” and for an age that believes no longer in an immortal God, the state becomes the only God there is” (1965: 197). Even the United Nations’ (UN) power is limited. According to Article 1, section 2 of the June 1945 Charter of the United Nations, the purpose of the UN is only “To develop friendly relations amongst nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take appropriate measures to promote universal peace” (cited in Weston, et al. 1997: 11). Its mission is to promote world peace, but its original charter by no means gives this loosely configured body of member states carte blanche to impose its will on other states even if this is not exactly the case today in practice. Carr also believed that the system of international relations was and always will be anarchic: “Countries which are struggling to force their way into the dominant group naturally tend to invoke nationalism against the internationalism of the controlling powers” (1949: 86). Here one can see the beginnings of what later realists would discuss as balance of power theory. To understand international politics is not to understand harmonious relations between actors, rather it is to understand the driving forces of what account for the clashes of interests between actors. Since the international order is anarchic, neorealists have argued that the primary motivating factor of states in the international order is their own existential security. This is the ontological break between the role of an anarchic world order and constructivism. “Each unit’s incentive is to put itself in a position to take care of itself since nobody else can be counted on to do so” (Waltz 1979: 107). For neorealists, regardless of social circumstances, existential security will always be the primary motivating factor of states. This means that it is unlikely that the future will see any real paradigm shift in terms of the functioning of international life. This means that the prognosis for any major shift in the way the international order operates is rather unlikely. While the notion of the international order as being anarchic is an obvious staple to realism, it also has applicability in constructivist thought. As discussed, constructivism’s ontological basis is steeped in the notion of identities being constructed in international relations. Barkin’s argument that constructivism centres on intersubjectivity instead of pure power politics is important when further exploring this point. In the words of Alexander Wendt, “Despite important differences, cognitivists, poststructuralists, standpoint and postmodern feminists, rule theorists, and structurationists share a concern with the basic ‘sociological’ issue bracketed by rationalists-namely, the issue of identity- and interestformation” (1992: 393). Wendt’s constructivism which is deeply rooted in Waltz’s structural realism does not deny that international relations are anarchic nor that power is important. What he does deny is that the ‘self-help world’ of international politics derives tautologically from anarchy and power like classical or neorealists; “self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure” and that, “[a]narchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992: 394–95). Other constructivist scholars echo a similar sentiment. Cameron Thies claims that “Anarchy, while appearing as a constant structure determining the environment of world politics, is actually always in process” (2004: 164). This differs fundamentally from the view of realists on the relationship between self-help behaviour and anarchy. While constructivists and realists may have a different view on the ontological primacy of ‘self-help’ behaviour as being a necessary condition of an international order that is anarchic, this does not mean both realism and constructivism disagree in any fundamental way about the notion of anarchy as an important theme to consider. As argued above, Wendt makes it clear that constructivism is amenable to the idea of a largely anarchic world order; rather it is the inevitability of self-help behaviour that is the point of real departure between realist and constructivist theories (Bennett 2013). They also disagree with whether or not states are always driven by fear and existential threats. For example, would it be appropriate to assume the expansion of the British Empire was driven by fear of foreign conquest at a time when they were far and away the global hegemonic power, and not living in the age of global terrorism? Constructivists would argue that one cannot automatically assume each state will always be driven by fears of existential threats to their security when crafting their foreign policy; structures within states themselves play a major role in whether or not a state behaves primarily out of fear or for some other reason. The extent to which the structures impact these behaviours is what really differentiates realists from constructivists in this particular sense. Anarchy is caused by state interactions (Thies 2004). If state interactions are properly understood in their proper social and psychological contexts, and the way states actually interact, enter into alliances, and engage in foreign trade were different, the situation of anarchy may differ. This does not mean anarchy will disappear, but it could mean a different type of anarchy could exist.

Theme 3: Balance of Power and Balance of Threat

In the late 1970’s Kenneth Waltz offered a theory of international behaviour that suggested states will either seek to balance the power of a stronger actor or bandwagon with that actor. Stephen Walt defined balancing as siding with others against a prevailing threat, while he defines bandwagoning as siding “with the source of danger” (1987: 17). Walt held that balancing is more common than bandwagoning in international politics noting that “joining the weaker side increases the new members influence within the alliance because the weaker side has a greater need for assistance” (1987: 18). When balancing, the aligning state may not have any other prior engagements with a particular state, but nonetheless joins forces with that state in order to stand firm against a larger threat. Stronger states generally prefer to engage in balancing behaviours and that when available, these states will seek other states to balance with against the threatening state or entity. However, when there is no real other option, bandwagoning is more common. Bandwagoning implies the old saying, if you can’t beat them, join them. A state facing a direct threat with no other feasible alternative is more likely to bandwagon with that potential threat. Walt believes that most states do not wish to act this way because it mitigates their own capacities as autonomous actors. A state that bandwagons with a stronger power is likely to lose a great deal of autonomy. Balance of threat theory is an upgrade from the implausible balance of power theory which has been criticised by a litany of scholars for its empirical shortcomings (Nexon 2009; Ikenberry 2002; Wolforth 1999; Cederman 1994; Schroeder 1994). Following the end of the Cold War, states did not immediately rush to balance the hegemonic power of the United States as balance of power theory would suggest. Walt questioned Waltz’s balance of power claim “and argued instead [that] states balance against the greatest threats to their interests, defining threats as a product of perceived intentions, ideology, and distance as well as capabilities” (Levy 2003: 129). According to balance of threat theory, states seek to balance in terms of the level of threat a particular state presents to itself, rather than based solely on power. If an actor is not considered a threat to a particular state, then that state will not necessarily balance against it. Balance of threat theorists argue that states are more concerned with perceived threats to their existence, rather than simply being driven by fears of raw power alone. State identities obviously become important when sizing up another state’s intentions. Balance of threat approaches to international relations can also be explored using constructivist methods. Petr Kratochvil notes that; “One of the oft-cited exceptions on one side of the cleft is Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory, which shows how close the starting point of realist thinking is to constructivist theories. Indeed, the questions Walt asks are virtually identical to those posed by constructivist scholars” (2004: 3). The issues Kratochvil are alluding to are those of constructed identities and identity formation. Levy (2003) points out that there is not one particular universal balance of power theory. Instead, there are numerous balance of power approaches that share similar realist theoretical assumptions. An entire calculus of variables goes into a state’s assessment of whether another particular state is a threat or not. Threats to the state or national security are generally discovered via social interactions with other individuals or state actors (Kratochvil 2004). Understanding a state’s ‘perceived intentions’ is not an exact science by any means. A states geographic proximity also factors into whether a state is viewed as a potential threat. Despite the tensions between Iran and the United States, it is obvious that these tensions would be much higher if these two nations were not literally on the opposite side of the world. The problem in properly assessing a threat lies in the difficulties of quantifying the ‘level of threat’ based on any one particular variable, such as relative proximity or ideology. This type of approach to international relations easily falls within the epistemological approach offered by constructivists.

The Case of Thucydides— An Empirical Example Articulating Differences in Ontological Primacy between Realists and Constructivists

The best way to illustrate the point this article is making is to look at the ontological differences between realists and constructivists on a specific historical and literary topic that each school of thought has in the past explored in detail; the case of Thucydides. Both realists and constructivists have traced the origins of international relations and their respective approaches all the way back to Thucydides’ classic work, The History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides method for gathering his information was uniquely modern; he used strict standards for evidence gathering and based his explanations on cause and effect rather than metaphysical explanations related to supernatural phenomena or ‘gods’ (Cochrane 1929). While realists and constructivists both trace their roots back to Thucydides, they both offer different interpretations of meaning and what was ontologically primary in his work. Traditionally, realists have claimed Thucydides as one of their own. Jonathan Monten argues that the Athenian Thesis embodies what would later become the basis of political realism in international relations. The Athenian thesis is the clearest representation of realist thought in The Peloponnesian War, and in portraying the history of a system of independent city-states interacting in the absence of an overarching political authority; Thucydides through actors such as the Corcyrans, the Mytelineans, and most consistently the Athenians introduces elements of what would become known as the realpolitik tradition. (2006: 5) The Athenian thesis in many ways parallels the notion of anarchy that is posited as given in both realism and often unavoidable in constructivism. The Athenian city-state was not organised in the same manner as modern independent sovereign nations. The varying competing city-states in the ancient Greek world were much smaller in population and land possession than modern nation-states. Nonetheless, these city-states behaved much like modern nation states; both modern nation states and ancient city states emphasised security in an anarchic world of international relations. Like modern nation states, international justice and altruism arelargely rhetorical devices used by the Athenians. In the words of Clifford Orwin, “The Athenians…can live neither with piety nor without it. Without caring to observe its restrictions except where convenient, neither have they purged their souls of the hopes and fears that piety nurtures” (1989: 237). This is very similar to the way modern realists would argue that states follow the rules of piety or fairness; when and only when it suits their needs. Another critical element of the work of Thucydides that realists argue corresponds with realism is the idea of the primacy of state actors in the international order. Keohane argues that, “1) states (or city-states) are the key units of action; 2) they seek power either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and 3) they behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms” (1986: 7). Thucydides’ work embodies all three of these elements that are essential to realism. It assumes the primacy of state actors in “as a simplifying device, referring, for example, to Athenians, Melians, or Spartans as coherent, unitary actors in the international system” (Monten 2006: 8). For Thucydides, the key to understanding conflicts lies within understanding the motivations behind each independent state’s behaviour. In the end, states are constructed by social actors who make decisions based on their own needs and interests. Despite the fact that states are constructed by individual social actors, the state remains the primary unit of analysis in Thucydides account of the international order. While it is obvious that realism can trace many parts of its roots back to Ancient Greece (Frankel 1996; Keohane 1986; Walt 2002; Waltz 1979), constructivists also have compelling arguments that show their respective paradigm’s roots can be traced back to the same source. Peter Ahrensdorf (1997) went as far as to contest whether the Hellenic international system was even anarchic since many Ancients believed that there exists a divinely enforced moral order, in which there was an agent that governed the international order. Altheide and Johnson (1994) argued that writers like Thucydides highlighted the prominence of individuals in their narratives and actually challenged realist assumptions of state centricity. Ahrensdorf’s argument is quite speculative, as it is impossible to adequately quantify how seriously the Ancient Greeks took their own myths. However, the prominence of individuals and the role of the narrative are quite relevant and reasonable ways in which constructivists have read Thucydides. Altheide and Johnson (1994) claim that the social world is actually an interpreted world. It is through writing and discourse that history is constructed. Writers are always at some level shaped by factors such as gender, social class, and ideology when constructing any narrative. Understanding this fact makes understanding Ned Lebow’s interpretation of Thucydides much easier to understand. While Lebow recognises that realism and Thucydides have undeniable connections, he nonetheless argues that “Thucydides is a founding father of constructivism” and that his history was meant “to explore the relationship between nomos (convention, custom, [and] law) and phusis (nature) and its implications for the development and preservation of civilization” (2001: 547). Similar to other constructivist arguments, Lebow’s discourse is steeped heavily in recognising the importance of language and literary style. Understanding the role gender, class, and ideology played in Thucydides’ writing is essential to understanding the actual intent of his narrative. The work of Thucydides “shows not only how language and convention establish identities and enable power to be translated into influence but also how the exercise of power can undermine language and convention” (Lebow 2001: 547). One of Lebow’s broader claims is that once the Athenians were no longer able to use the language of justification to promote their foreign policy, their power is all but vanquished. Regardless of their military might and rich history, they no longer were capable of winning the war of ideas. “By the time of the Sicilian debate, the Athenians can no longer speak and act coherently, and this failure is the underlying reason for their empire’s decline” (Lebow 2001: 548). This emphasis on the importance of language and rhetoric is largely ignored by realists who argue that the structure of the international order shapes behaviours and outcomes. Language and rhetoric are internal to the individual state and are not related to the ‘given’ anarchic order that realists posit as inherent in all international relations. Lebow’s argument is powerful; it suggests actors with greater military capabilities are not immune from losing their power. Public opinion and internal policy cohesion cannot be ignored. Short sightedness and internal incompetence and corruption played a critical role in the failure of the Athenian’s. Internal discord and a loss of civic virtue all facilitated in the fall of the Roman Empire a few centuries later as well (Gibbon 2001). If Lebow is correct about the extent that language and winning the ‘war of ideas’ is important, powerful state actors should be aware that simply having the strongest army does not safeguard a regime from collapse. While recognising the role of military capabilities and state power, Lebow nonetheless gives ontological primacy to language in his interpretation of Thucydides; this is why Lebow’s account of Thucydides is fundamentally a constructivist one. The different appropriations of Thucydides serve as an excellent example of a difference in the operationalisation of ontological primacy between constructivist and realist interpretations of international relations. When evaluating where constructivists and realists differ on the interpretation of Thucydides, it becomes clear that the difference between them is in what Thucydides was really trying to convey to his readers. Barkin argues that what each approach centres on (i.e. gives ontological primacy to) is what ultimately differentiates the two theories commenting that constructivism “centers on intersubjectivity, whereas that of realism centers on power politics” (2010: 9). The key word in the above quote is on the word “centers.” The operational definition offered by Barkin of realism and constructivism is an example of an ontological difference rather than a thematic one that can be applied to the Thucydides example. Realists view Thucydides primarily via a power politics lens; whereas constructivists view Thucydides via intersubjectivity and language.

Conclusion: Themes and Ontological Primacy the way Forward

Trine Flockhart argues that we are entering a “a new global order characterized by diversity in power, principles and institutions” (2016: 4) The old approaches to the international order simply will not suffice in an ever-changing world in which multipolarity, the decline of US power, and the rise of China along with ascendant mid-level powers seems almost undeniable. This article called for a re-thinking of rigid paradigmatic fealty and showed that constructivists and realists both engage with many of the same themes; it is what each approach gives ontological primacy to that truly differentiates them. Integrating the notion of ontological primacy into the broader IR theoretical discussion allows for IR theories to better retain their distinctive character while at the same time allowing for necessary thematic overlap which is essential for the further development of both paradigms. Integrative and structural pluralism therefore should not be understood simply as the melding of constructivism and realism (or any other IR theories for that matter) into a cumbersome and watereddown metatheory, nor should they be understood as an effort to dissolve the lines between paradigms altogether. Rather, pluralistic approaches should be understood as those that allow for, and even encourage, active engagement with an eclectic variety of themes, while at the same time, allowing each paradigm to retain their core ontological assumptions. Eclecticism within reason is a good way to develop theories and better understand the world (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). One can be a realist and accept the tangible role of domestic norms and structure, so long as they accept the primary ontological position of realism, that the anarchic international order, dominated by self-help behaviour is still the driving force behind the international order. The same goes for constructivists who address similar themes as realists; one can still be a constructivist who acknowledges the real impact of the anarchic/self-help international order, so long as they do not adhere to the ontological realist position that it is always the most essential and primary factor behind global political discourse between state actors. The main representatives of the most prominent ‘isms’ in IR Theory waded into the waters of opposing discourses long ago. The people writing about these representatives of the most prominent ‘isms’ have made the mistake of compartmentalising these nodal IR theorists into rigid camps or paradigms. Yet scholars have often presented their findings as if one ‘paradigm,’ focusing on just one of these sets of mechanisms, should displace another. This not only misapplies the notion of paradigms, it misreads the work of Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, and Alex Wendt, the three iconic representatives of the main ‘isms’ in IR. In fact, none of these scholars has been wedded to using only one ‘paradigm’ to explain international politics. (Bennett 2013: 463) Legro and Moravscik also echo this point about the fluidity between paradigms pointing out that many realists have shifted their explanations into arenas more commonly seen as constructivist commenting that “while contemporary realists continue to speak of international ‘power,’ their midrange explanations of state behavior have subtly shifted the core emphasis from variation in objective power to variation in beliefs and perceptions of power” (1999: 34-35). Despite the thematic lines being blurred between realism and constructivism, it is safe to assume that at a deep ontological level, they are still quite different, and this will not be changing anytime soon. Too often the primary distinction between realism and constructivism is inappropriately reduced to a difference in thematic concerns; this is an oversimplification. The longstanding criticisms of realism and constructivism still remain. Critics of realism contest that modern realism does not really explain anything and is too pessimistic about the possibility of meaningful change in state behaviour, whereas critics of constructivism argue that language games that overemphasise social identity leaves one overly optimistic, trapped within the musings a naïve liberal idealism. Efforts to synthesise both approaches also have weaknesses. It is very much not the stuff of a new paradigm—being a hybrid, it suffers the limitations of both constructivism and realism, and as such is only applicable to a subset of questions in international relations, those that look at the social construction of public policy, particularly foreign policy, in international politics. (Barkin 2010: 8) Theories that seek to explain structure should never be ignored. Randall Schweller aptly comments that, “The cure for weak systemic theories is not to ignore the effects of structure on behavior and outcomes but rather to create better systemic theories” (1998: 184). Better systematic theories should make efforts to incorporate behaviour and the realities of power politics into their discourse. Brown, who borrows from Stephen White, comments that “the aspiration to produce Grand Theory should not be abandoned, but such theory must be actionguiding as well as world-revealing” (Brown 2013: 494). This seems to be the most reasonable way to move international relations theorising to a new level.

#### Interventions don’t prove an instrumental thesis; political stakes and strategic planning are key to contextualize and resolve violence

Chandler 9, Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster (David Chandler, June 2009, "War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of 'Global War'," Security Dialogue, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 243-262, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26299790)

Liberal War and the Biopolitical Critique

Perhaps the most well-known advocates of a biopolitical framework of critique and framing of the international in terms of the return to global war are radical academics Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who argue that modern war has exceeded the territorial boundaries of both nation-states and international law, and should be seen as globalized or imperial civil war (Hardt & Negri, 2006: 3–4): The world is at war again, but things are different this time. Traditionally war has been conceived as the armed conflict between sovereign political entities, that is, during the modern period, between nation states. To the extent that the sovereign authority of nation states, even the most dominant nation states, is declining and there is instead emerging a new supranational form of sovereignty, a global Empire, the conditions and nature of war and political violence are necessarily changing. War is becoming a general phenomenon, global and interminable. Hardt & Negri (2006: 5) assert that today we are witnessing a ‘general global state of war’, which erodes the distinctions of modern territorialized frameworks of politics and law: between the domestic and the international, war and peace, and combatant and civilian. War, in this framework, becomes the key to understanding power relations in liberal governmental or biopolitical terms of regulation. On the basis of, and reflecting upon, the declarations of US authorities, Hardt & Negri (2006: 14) understand global war as unending and unlimited struggle to control and regulate the global social and economic order: One consequence of this new kind of war is that the limits of war are rendered indeterminate, both spatially and temporally. The old-fashioned war against a nation state was clearly defined spatially . . . and the end of such a war was generally marked by the surrender, victory, or truce between the conflicting states. By contrast, war against a concept or a set of practices, somewhat like a war of religion, has no definite spatial or temporal boundaries. . . . Indeed, when US leaders announced the ‘war against terrorism’ they emphasized that it would have to extend throughout the world and continue for an indefinite period, perhaps decades or even generations. A war to create and maintain social order can have no end. It must involve the continuous, uninterrupted exercise of power and violence. In other words, one cannot win such a war, or, rather, it has to be won again every day. War has thus become indistinguishable from police activity. Here, global war is understood to encompass the very framework of modern politics: a war that the dominant elites are alleged to need to wage to maintain or police their system of biopolitical order. The shift from a policy discourse of national defence to one of global security is seen, at face value, as demonstrating the construction of a new global and deterritorialized order that depends on ‘actively and constantly shaping the environment through military and/or police activity. Only an actively shaped world is a secure world’ (Hardt & Negri, 2006: 20). Hardt & Negri draw freely from the Foucauldian problematic that reads politics to be merely the extension of – or another form of – war, thereby inverting (or clarifying) the Clausewitzian proposition that war is the continuation of politics by other means (see Foucault, 2003: 15; 2007: 305–306). War becomes then a generalized concept for political struggle and the reproduction of power relations. In inverting Clausewitz, Foucault (2003: 15–16) was intentionally deconstructing the division between war and politics to draw out the inequalities and power relations that are hidden behind the façade of liberal frameworks of political and legal equality, demonstrating that it is these frameworks themselves that are produced by and reproduce hegemonic relations of domination. For Foucault (2003: 13–14), the argument that politics is a form of war was intended to overcome what he saw as the narrow economic determinism of the Marxist political movement of his day. However, the conflation of war with politics has allowed theorists working within the Foucauldian framework to make global war a technique of regulatory control, central to the reconstitution of power relations. As Vivienne Jabri (2007: 116) argues: ‘War itself is, in these circumstances and frameworks of knowledge, a regulatory practice, a technology of government that aims at the wholesale transformation of societies as well as the international system as a whole.’ For many critical post-structuralist theorists, the ‘global war on terror’ reveals the essence of liberal modernity and fully reveals the limits of its universalist ontology of peace and progress, where the reality of Kant’s ‘perpetual peace’ is revealed to be perpetual war (Reid, 2006: 18). Perhaps the most radical abstract framing of global war is that of Giorgio Agamben. In his seminal work Homo Sacer, he reframed Foucault’s understanding of bio­power in terms of the totalizing control over bare life, arguing that the ‘exemplary places of modern biopolitics [were] the concentration camp and the structure of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century’ (Agamben, 1998: 4; see also Chandler, 2009a). Agamben’s view of liberal power is that of the concentration camp writ globally, where we are all merely objects of power, ‘we are all virtually homines sacri’ (Agamben, 1998: 115). In focusing on biopower as a means of critiquing universalist policy discourses of global security, critical theorists of global war from diverse fields such as security studies (Jabri, 2007), development (Duffield, 2007) or critical legal theory (Douzinas, 2007) are in danger of reducing their critique of war to abstract statements instrumentalizing war as a technique of global power. These are abstract critiques because the political stakes are never in question: instrumentality and the desire for regulation and control are assumed from the outset. In effect, the critical aspect is merely in the reproduction of the framework of Foucault – that liberal discourses can be deconstructed as an exercise of regulatory power. Without deconstructing the dominant framings of global security threats, critical theorists are in danger of reproducing Foucault’s framework of biopower as an ahistorical abstraction. Foucault (2007: 1) himself stated that his analysis of biopower was ‘not in any way a general theory of what power is. It is not a part or even the start of such a theory’, merely the study of the effects of liberal governance practices, which posit as their goal the interests of society – the population – rather than government. In his recent attempt at a ground-clearing critique of Foucauldian international relations theorizing, Jan Selby (2007) poses the question of the problem of the translation of Foucault from a domestic to an international context. He argues that recasting the international sphere in terms of global liberal regimes of regulation is an accidental product of this move. This fails to appreciate the fact that many critical theorists appear to be drawn to Foucault precisely because drawing on his work enables them to critique the international order in these terms. Ironically, this ‘Foucauldian’ critique of ‘global wars’ has little to do with Foucault’s understanding or concerns, which revolved around extending Marx’s critique of the ‘freedoms’ of liberal modernity. In effect, the post-Foucauldians have a different goal: they desire to understand and to critique war and military intervention as a product of the regulatory coercive nature of liberalism. This project owes much to the work of Agamben and his focus on the regulation of ‘bare life’, where the concentration camp, the totalitarian state and (by extension) Guantánamo Bay are held to constitute a moral and political indictment of liberalism (Agamben, 1998: 4). In these critical frameworks, global war is understood as the exercise of global aspirations for control, no longer mediated by the interstate competition that was central to traditional ‘realist’ framings of international relations. This less-mediated framework understands the interests and instrumental techniques of power in global terms. As power becomes understood in globalized terms, it becomes increasingly abstracted from any analysis of contemporary social relations: viewed in terms of neoliberal governance, liberal power or biopolitical domination. In this context, global war becomes little more than a metaphor for the operation of power. This war is a global one because, without clearly demarcated political subjects, the unmediated operation of regulatory power is held to construct a world that becomes, literally, one large concentration camp (Agamben, 1998: 171) where instrumental techniques of power can be exercised regardless of frameworks of rights or international law (Agamben, 2005: 87). For Julian Reid (2006: 124), the ‘global war on terror’ can be understood as an inevitable response to any forms of life that exist outside – and are therefore threatening to – liberal modernity, revealing liberal modernity itself to be ultimately a ‘terrorising project’ arraigned against the vitality of life itself. For Jabri, and other Foucauldian critics, the liberal peace can only mean ‘unending war’ to pacify, discipline and reconstruct the liberal subject: The discourse from Bosnia to Kosovo to Iraq is one that aims to reconstruct societies and their government in accordance with a distinctly Western liberal model the formative elements of which centre on open markets, human rights and the rule of law, and democratic elections as the basis of legitimacy. The aim is no less than to reconstitute polities through the transformation of political cultures into modern, self-disciplining, and ultimately self-governing entities that, through such transformation, could transcend ethnic or religious fragmentation and violence. The trajectory is punishment, pacification, discipline, and ultimately ‘liberal democratic self-mastery’. Each step in turn services wider, global remits so that the pacified, the disciplined, the self-governing of the liberal order can no longer pose a threat either to their own or to others. (Jabri, 2007: 124–125; see also Duffield, 2007) Control over, or the ordering of, society is written in global terms rather than national ones. These critical post-structuralist frameworks see global war as an extended desire for control – as the extension of liberal governmentality from the national sphere to the global one. The Foucauldian critics of global war take at face value the problematization of the non-Western world – seen as a threat to the needs of the liberal biopolitical order – and the policy frameworks, which are seen to have the global aims asserted by their proponents. Where the critics of global war differ from its advocates appears to be essentially over whether these liberal values and aspirations are worth fighting for, rather than on the context and stakes of the globalized struggle itself. For the radical Foucauldian and post-structuralist critics, it is liberal values and frameworks that lead to war and construct the non-Western ‘other’ as an object of intervention, whether through military means or non-military frameworks of development (Duffield, 2007). The ad hoc, counterproductive and often irrational interventions of Western states and international institutions are therefore understood (and rationalized) through the framework of an essentialized liberal teleology of progress and Western mission. Beate Jahn (2007a: 90–94), for example, argues that the global policy rhetoric of the post-Cold War period is not exceptional but inherent in the expansionist dynamic of liberalism, with its teleological approach to history and development – with liberal frameworks held to be the pinnacle to be reached by all, once the barriers to progress have been lifted – that is implicitly global in conception (see also Jahn, 2007b). Furthermore, Jahn (2007a: 103) argues that the ‘totalizing ideology of liberalism’ is an essential driver of interventionist foreign policy. This is an ideology so powerful that it is held to explain Western policy however irrational it appears on its own terms (Jahn, 2007b: 226–227): In sum, the reason for the repetition of these counterproductive policies lies in the length, breadth and depth of the power of the liberal ideology. . . . Ultimately, the length and breadth of the power of liberalism lies in its depth: providing the foundational world view for liberal societies in general and for their social sciences in particular. . . . [T]he liberal ideology has been able to reassert itself in spite of a host of scientific analyses questioning every single one of its claims – resulting in studies in which conclusions stand in blatant contradiction to the analysis itself. For radical critics of global wars, such as Jahn, these wars reveal the contradictory essence of the liberal global order, in which governance is organized around a teleological view of liberal peace and progress. The failures or counterproductive nature of many of these interventions is seen to merely confirm the contradictions and limits of liberalism and the liberal aspiration to control and order society. It is these limits and contradictions that are seen to be fully expressed in the globalization of liberal frameworks, particularly with the end of the Cold War. Ironically, the broadly Foucauldian critique of global war, in terms of liberal strategies of control, regulation and transformation, has become so established that liberal policymakers and national and international institutions are beginning to reproduce the critique of ‘liberal models’ as a way of understanding and rationalizing policy interventions. Many reflections on the problems of international intervention, whether in terms of the humanitarian wars in the Balkans or the ‘global war on terror’ interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, have argued that the problem was the export of liberal frameworks of the market and democracy. The liberal paradigms are alleged to have meant that policymakers had unrealistic expectations of intervention, failing to realize the problems of local ‘capture’ of ambitious peacebuilding or statebuilding interventions (Paris & Sisk, 2009). This ‘self-critique’ of liberal policy frameworks mimics the Foucauldians and flatters policy actors. Rather than being presented as shambolic, ad hoc or inadequately thought through, interventions can be rewritten as morally and strategically well designed, merely coming unstuck on their overestimation of the capacity of the target populations.

Carl Schmitt’s Critique

The growing popularity of critical Foucauldian approaches, which understand conflict in the framework of global war and the new global liberal order, has been reflected in the revival of interest in the work of Carl Schmitt. Schmitt and Foucault may seem like strange ‘bed-fellows’ considering their differing political outlooks and aspirations; in fact, their interconnection is not so surprising. Where ‘scaled up’ Foucauldian critical frameworks are vulnerable is in explaining why liberal governance should need or choose to take such a militarized form in the absence of apparent challenges (especially bearing in mind Foucault’s own contrast between coercive sovereign power and biopolitical approaches). Schmitt’s work seems to offer a much more grounded connection between liberalism and ‘unending war’ or unlimited conflict. Critical theorists, who rely on the fragile grounds of an essentialized connection between liberalism and global war, therefore tend to rely heavily on Schmitt to provide theoretical substance to their rather abstract theoretical framework. Critical theorists have been quick to claim that Schmitt’s influence on Leo Strauss was central to the neoconservative ideologies behind the US administration policy in the ‘war on terror’ (Bishai & Behnke, 2007: 107). Whether or not Schmitt’s view of global war is argued to inspire the US administration, there is little question that his framing of the nature of global conflict has been regularly melded with post-Foucauldian frameworks of global governmentality to set up an influential approach to understanding the apparent excesses of modern conflict – especially the abuses of the ‘global war on terror’, where the USA’s denial of rights to ‘illegal combatants’ in Guantánamo Bay and abuses of prisoners, such as at Abu Ghraib, have been held to be exemplary examples of the new liberal order of global war (see Koskenniemi, 2004). A recent collection of essays, for example, fêtes Schmitt as a theorist whose international theory – particularly his key work in this area, The Nomos of the Earth – can provide us with ‘a deeper understanding of the present international relations of crisis and epoch-making change in the normative structures of international society’. Its editors are not alone in asserting that Schmitt’s work: helps to analyse the rise of global terrorism, the current international political environment of the global ‘War on Terror’, the crisis of international legality, the emergence of US ‘imperial’ hegemony, and the prevalence of a global interventionist liberal cosmopolitanism. (Odysseos & Petito, 2007a: 3) Schmitt was writing during the intense inter-imperialist rivalry of the interwar period, and Nomos was published in the wake of the destruction of World War II. Schmitt’s context was one in which ‘global war’ was a pressing reality. It is for this reason that Schmitt highlighted the problematic and divisive nature of inter-imperialist rivalry, sharpened by clashes over universal moral claims, which he saw as making it impossible to legitimize a working arrangement between the great powers. Schmitt presented a powerful set of arguments about conflict and its management. He argued that politics was at heart about conflict (the distinction between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’) and how to handle it. For Schmitt, the management of conflict became easier the more transparent the relations of power were and the more ‘objective’ the understanding of them. He critiqued liberal universalism on the basis of its abstract character – its lack of material grounding – highlighting instead that there is no political unity of mankind: there is no world unity and therefore attempts to achieve such a unity through ‘ideological short-circuits’ can only suggest ‘fictional unities’ (Schmitt, 2003: 335). His critique of liberalism (in both the domestic and the international realms) was that it artificially sought to abolish conflict without being able to practically contain it (see, for example, Schmitt, 1988: 12). Schmitt saw the growth of US hegemony as undermining the European framework of international law, based on sovereign reciprocity among imperial equals, which ‘bracketed’ or limited war between them. His was a conservative and one-sided reappraisal of the past. European decline was already manifest in the playing out of World War I within Europe and the breaking down of the European ‘amity lines’ that were racially as well as territorially institutionalized (Schmitt, 2003: 219; see also Chandler, 2008a). The USA was as much the beneficiary as the cause of European decline. Of course, it suited European elites to focus on the role of this ‘upstart’ power in the postwar peace settlements and the shaping of a new international order, rather than look for failings closer to home. Schmitt’s conservative political perspective is apparent in his tendency to see US claims to universalism as responsible for the unconstrained or unlimited nature of conflict in the 20th century. Part of the key to Schmitt’s appeal to today’s critical theorists is the fact that the global conflict of the world wars is redescribed in terms of the problem of US hegemony. At the descriptive level, Schmitt associates the universal claims of US power with the development of absolute enmity, where the enemy is demonized as ‘inhuman’ and war is unlimited. Taken out of context (see Chandler, 2008b), Schmitt is read as arguing against universalism per se, as if universal claims automatically equated with barbarism while claims based on particularist national interests were somehow more civilized (see also Devetak, 2007). However, Schmitt is ill-suited to the essentially descriptive, critical post-structuralist ‘critique’ of empire, understood as US hegemonic sovereignty, equipped with ‘decisionist’ power and the normalization of the state of exception. His point was not so much that the USA was exercising global hegemonic power but rather the opposite: that this universalistic version of international law was abstract and, in fact, powerless to create order. As the Italian theorist Alessandro Colombo (2007: 32–33) notes with regard to the theory of just war: ‘In comparison to its medieval precedent, it lacks reference to a concrete institutional order, an adequate bearer of such an order (as the Church was before the civil wars of religion) and also a substantive idea of justice.’ Schmitt was not arguing against universalism per se, but against illegitimate or fictional universalism, as an idealized form without material content. The problem, as articulated by Schmitt, was not that there was a new nomos of US hegemony but that the USA was strong enough to undermine the old European order but not strong enough to found a new global one. The world was still divided, but with no agreement on methods of international regulation. The interwar order of the League of Nations may have proclaimed a global order, but it reflected merely the destruction of the old spatial order into ‘spaceless universalism, [while] no new order took its place’; the League conferences could not create genuine enforceable law ‘because they had neither the content of the old, specifically European spatial order nor the content of a new global spatial order’ (Schmitt, 2003: 192). The USA could undermine the old order, but the League, excluding the main powers – the USA and the Soviet Union – could not give content to a new one (Schmitt, 2003: 245). Schmitt was not concerned with limiting exercises of hegemonic imperial power abroad but with the bigger picture of global order between great powers, where he normatively hoped for the emergence of an imperial balance of power (Schmitt, 2003: 355). What today’s critical theorists take from Schmitt is the contingent reading that liberal universalist claims lead to unlimited war and the transformation of the enemy into a ‘criminal’. In fact, Schmitt becomes re-read as a pluralist post-structuralist, warning against the dictatorial hegemonic power of US or global neoliberal empire (see, for example, Mouffe, 2007; Petito, 2007; Ojakangas, 2007; Prozorov, 2007). The post-Foucauldian critique of sovereign power is transferred to a critique of the USA as the hegemonic sovereign of the international sphere. Extensions of and, more often, the undermining of international legal agreements are seen, therefore, as sovereign acts of deciding upon the exception and of normalizing the power of exception (see, for example, Jabri, 2007: 95, 99). Paradoxically, Schmitt, the founding theorist of a ‘geopolitical’ framework of international relations, is essentially conscripted to wage a highly abstract critique of ‘power’, ‘empire’ or ‘the liberal project’, which is seen as steamrolling over resistance on the grounds that the latter is not valid; that those who resist should be ‘eliminated’ as ‘inhuman’ or ‘criminal’. This approach to Schmitt parallels the way that critical theorists reproduce Foucault’s historically specific grounding of biopolitics – in the domestic crisis of state legitimacy and the state’s search for validation in regulation of the free play of market-based interests (Foucault, 2008) – in an essentialized form, reducing it to a lifeless abstraction. Schmitt’s understanding of the ‘unlimited’ global war of the 20th century, where the political stakes of inter-imperialist rivalries undermined the framework of legal constraints, is reproduced merely in form, as an abstraction: without contesting interestbearing political subjects. The critical grounding of global war in the needs of biopolitical or neoliberal capitalist domination and control appears to take the critique of liberalism from Foucault and Schmitt, but only at the cost of reducing historically grounded theorizing to assertions of an essentialized link between liberalism and global war.

Grounding the Abstraction of Global War

The critical opponents of liberal global war understand the globalization of war as stemming from the perceived security interests of Western actors: the need to enforce liberal governance domestically and internationally. They argue that the liberal outlook can only see the world in bifurcated terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, where the act of intervention is necessary to transform – through war, development or democratization – societies or individuals to fit the Western liberal image. In effect, this global war of liberal governance has no specific enemy but appears to be a generalized or free-floating drive of control and domination. War without enemies is a far cry from the central concerns of theorists of the last century, such as Carl Schmitt, for whom the enmity of class conflict or inter-imperialist rivalry threatened to become absolutized (where ‘real enemies’ were turned into ‘absolute enemies’). Today, it appears that global war is becoming ‘absolute’ without the prior existence of clear political stakes: without the fundamental political clash of social or class forces that can clarify the strategic and political-military goals of intervention. In one of his later works, The Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt (2004) touched on the problem of war (or, more properly, ‘violence’) freed from strategic ends – conflict without genuine political stakes or, in his terminology, without ‘real enemies’. Schmitt argued that war in the 19th century was increasingly fought in ways that blurred the distinctions of classical martial law, particularly in the role of irregular fighters or partisans that resisted enemy or colonial occupations. For Schmitt (2004: 13), the ‘genuine’ partisan had a tellurian character, and the fact that the partisan’s struggle was tied to a specific territory made the struggle a defensive and limited one. Schmitt (2004: 14) sought to counterpose the ‘genuine’, territorialized, or telluric partisan to the development of more irrational and ad hoc, or noninstrumental, partisan struggle: The partisan will present a specifically terrestrial type of the active fighter for at least as long as anti-colonial wars are possible. . . . However, even the autochthonous partisan . . . is drawn into the force-field of irresistible technical-industrial progress. His mobility is so enhanced by motorization that he runs the risk of complete dislocation. . . . A motorized partisan loses his tellurian character. All that’s left is a transportable, replaceable cog in the wheel of a powerful world-political machine. For Schmitt (2004: 52), the territorialized partisan was a ‘national and patriotic hero’, with a real enemy but not an absolute one, whose legitimacy was rooted in a strategic political relationship to a political community. In contrast, the motorized, deterritorialized partisan was dependent on external, foreign backers for support. Schmitt sought to argue that those who were unpatriotic and challenged their governing elites under the banner of revolutionary struggle were illegitimate and externally manipulated as ‘replaceable cogs in the wheel of a powerful world-political machine’, that is, the Soviet Union. Schmitt’s work expressed fully his understanding of the ‘absolute’ threat seen to be posed by the revolutionary movement, backed by the funding of the Soviet Union. However, going beyond Schmitt’s conservative political framing and conclusions, he made some fundamentally important points regarding war as a strategic political act and the use of violence as a global or non-strategic, non-instrumental expression of enmity. The shift from the telluric partisan to the deterritorialized combatant – whose struggle was not based on the need for concrete strategy around clear political stakes – is a crucial one. Schmitt argued that deterritorialized struggle, which is potentially unlimited, depended on a break from social and political strategic constraints. This break from strategic constraint largely depended on reliance upon an interested third party, which could underwrite the struggle, although Schmitt (2004: 56) also indicated that, with technological developments, the means could be available for the motorized partisan to provide his own tools of destruction, thereby freeing him from the need for strategy and enabling him to wage his own individual ‘war’ on the world. Schmitt argued that without a real enemy there could not be real war in the sense of a politically meaningful struggle. The partisan defence of homeland against an invader or occupier clearly provided a real war and a real enemy. For Schmitt (2004: 66), a deterritorialized war for abstract ideas (such as the revolutionary struggle against capitalism) lacked a real enemy and therefore became global rather than territorial. The implication of Schmitt’s argument is that global war can become ‘unlimited’ or ‘absolute’ in the sense that there is less that is strategic or instrumental about the waging of it. Global wars can become ‘wars of choice’, rather than wars of political or strategic necessity, once the enemy becomes an abstraction rather than a concrete opponent. For Schmitt, the deterritorialization of war – the loss of the telluric character of the partisan – was problematic, because conflict became free-floating. As he argued: Annihilation thus becomes entirely abstract and entirely absolute. It is no longer directed against an enemy, but serves only another, ostensibly objective attainment of highest values, for which no price is too high to pay. It is the renunciation of real enmity that opens the door for the work of annihilation of an absolute enmity. (Schmitt, 2004: 67) Schmitt argued that waging war without a real enemy was likely to make violence more indiscriminate, rather than less, and that posing war in global terms, rather than limited national ones, reflected the fact that the conflict was less grounded in strategic necessity. In this framework, ‘global war’ does not necessarily mean war that is more destructive than interstate war. Rather, it indicates a war that is fought without real enemies: war that is driven by ideas of self-expression rather than imposed necessity, and war that is disassociated from any clear strategic grounding in the struggle between the conflicting interests of collective political subjects. Reading the violence of ‘global war’ as ‘unlimited’ owing to its abstract and ungrounded, ad hoc, contingent character provides a useful way of understanding the motorized partisans of deterritorialized, or globalized, terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda (see, for example, de Benoist 2007). Perhaps the most insightful of such analyses is that of Faisal Devji’s Landscapes of the Jihad, in which Devji (2005: 1–2) argues that the abstract, deterritorialized nature of Al-Qaeda’s struggle is what has given it its globalized nature: It was indeed the [disproportion] between Al-Qaeda’s severely limited means and seemingly limitless ends that made a global movement of its jihad. . . . This jihad is global not because it controls people, places and circumstances over vast distances, for Al-Qaeda’s control of such things is negligible . . . but for precisely the opposite reason: because it is too weak to participate in the politics of control. Devji makes the compelling point that the violent excesses of Al-Qaeda stem precisely from their lack of connection to a territorial struggle. Once the ‘politics of control’ are renounced or given up, then struggle is deterritorialized or globalized. For Devji, as for Olivier Roy (2004), Al-Qaeda’s ‘global war’ can only be understood in relation to the defeat of political Islam: as a product of defeat and marginalization rather than a growth of radical purpose, capacity and meaning. For Devji (2005: 156), the global jihad ‘has little to do with American malignity and everything to do with the fact that a politics based on national causes is being made increasingly irrelevant’; it is therefore global through weakness and social disconnection rather than through strength, ‘a perverse call to ethics in an arena where the old-fashioned politics can no longer operate – because it can no longer control’. This lack of territorial grounding, or social relationship to a clear constituency, frees ‘globalized’ combatants, such as Al-Qaeda, from the need for a real, concrete, strategic enemy. The fight against an abstract enemy is not a ‘war’, properly understood, because there is no political relationship, no strategic engagement, no intentionality relating means to the ends. Gary Ulmen (2007: 103) insightfully argues that fundamentalist terrorists do not engage in war understood politically – that is, they are not engaged in a strategic or instrumental use of violence and ‘seek to appeal to no other constitu­ency than themselves’. For Devji (2005: 11–12), the deterritorialized nature of Al-Qaeda’s ‘global war’ can be better understood in comparison with the atomized protest of modern ‘global social movements’ than in the context of political struggle, where the high stakes and social mobilization of society make destruction inevitable: [Al-Qaeda is] characteristic of global movements more generally. . . . These are movements whose practices are ethical rather than political in nature because they have been transformed into gestures of risk and duty rather than acts of instrumentality. However instrumental their intentions, the politics of such movements are invariably transformed into ethics at a global level. . . . Like such movements, Greenpeace, for instance, the global effects of the jihad bring together allies and enemies of the most heterogeneous character, who neither know or communicate each with the other, and who in addition share almost nothing by way of a prior history. However, it is not just modern terrorism that undertakes the projection of violence without clear strategic frameworks and political goals. There has been no shortage of commentary acknowledging the abstract and problematic nature of the US-led global war ‘against a concept’. Devji (2005: 156) himself notes that, ‘by its very abstraction, the “War on Terror” leaves behind all enemies of a traditional kind to contend with something more metaphysical than empirical’. Clearly it is the abstract, metaphysical nature of the ‘war on terror’ that lends itself to being understood and critiqued within Foucauldian frameworks of ‘unending’ or ‘unlimited’ global war. For these radical commentators, however, the discursive framing of the ‘war on terror’ in abstract terms is seen purely as an assertion of global hegemonic power and regulatory intent. The next section seeks to stress that the Western military interventions of today should be understood as ‘global’ – much like the fundamentalist jihad – not in the sense of aspirations for regulation and control, but in the sense of being non-strategic and lacking a political-military instrumentality.

Rethinking Global War

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to ‘motorized partisans’, in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of ‘global war’ have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with ‘global war’ thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines ‘global’ war today. Very few studies of the ‘war on terror’ start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent

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with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the ‘war on terror’ (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are ‘scaled up’ from the international to the global. Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire. The alternative reading of ‘global war’ rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the lack of political stakes and strategic structuring of the international sphere rather than frameworks for asserting global domination. We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the ‘war on terror’ campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. There would appear to be a direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping and structuring interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome. In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and arbitrary interventions as states and international institutions use the lack of strategic imperatives to construct their own meaning through intervention. As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains: war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz’s classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. . . . War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most ‘efficient’ way of finding one. The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to ‘war’. In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are freed from strategic necessities and whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against ‘real enemies’. The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests.

# 2NC

## T

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Problem-oriented approaches are necessary. Starting with sweeping philosophical concerns indefinitely brackets off social inequality.

Lois **McNay 14---their author**. Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University and Fellow of Somerville College. 2014. “The Misguided Search for the Political.” p. 214-215

What other features might a radical democratic theory possess that takes seriously the critique of social suffering? It may be more fruitful to adopt an approach that, at least in the first instance, is problem- rather than model-oriented. Radical democrats might do better to develop principles from an initial focus on specific issues of social inequality, rather than embark at the outset on a quest to distil the essence of the political and from this derive models into which all concrete struggles are subsequently shoehorned. Of course, any problem-oriented approach will unavoidably be 'influenced' by theoretical presuppositions, but it won't necessarily be as ‘driven’ by the rigid logic of the model that seems to flow from a one-sided focus on political ontology (see Shapiro 2007). It is, after all, a problem-oriented approach that has informed many other types of radical theorizing, such as feminism, and has made them suspicious of the formal abstractions of theory that disregard the distinctiveness of certain group experiences (e.g. Martineau and Squires 2012). Partly because of its established links with activism, feminist theorizing has more often than not been propelled, in the first instance, by particular problems relating to gender inequality and the marginalized experiences of women. Feminist political theorizing about justice, for instance, starts with the problem of the gendered division of labour, and the undervaluing of women's care work. It uses this sociological perspective to expose the conceptual deficiencies of asocial individualism as a device for deriving principles of justice because of the way it obscures human vulnerability and dependency and thereby fails to recognize care as a fundamental element of social justice (Bubeck 1995; Fraser 1997; Kittay 1999). Others feminists think through issues of democratic participation starting from the problem of the underrepresentation of women in [END PAGE 214] established democratic structures, their effective political invisibility, which is a consequence of their vulnerable position as workers in transnational production processes (e.g. Fraser 2008; Phillips 1991). The hope is that a problem-oriented approach to radical democratic theorizing is less likely to result in the marginalization of the actual and disregard of distinctive group experiences than are approaches oriented to the issue of ontology. The difficulty with the latter approaches is that the strategy of temporarily bracketing off social relations in order to capture the essence of the political turns into a theoretical inability to reintroduce excluded issues of power without violating the pristine foundational logic that they claim to have identified. Consequently, the logic of political ontology is given an unwarranted primacy that effectively occludes the autonomy and specificity of social relations and practices.

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Differently put, in so far as it lacks a sense of mediation, this political anti-essentialism becomes an essentialism. Thus, Mouffe is unable to address substantive issues about power that have a direct bearing on her model of democratic agonism because of a misplaced fear of falling into an essentialism that would violate her rigid linguistic constructivism. Arendtian ideas of political action as creative inauguration are famously empty, proscribing many issues of subordination and oppression by relegating them to the realm of social necessity and, therefore, privacy. Although his ontology of abundance is more materialist in nature, Connolly finds it hard to incorporate types of social experience or practice that do not conform to his notions of creative becoming and dynamic assemblages. In all these cases, social being is treated in a tokenistic and cipher-like fashion as simply yet another empirical exemplification of foundational dynamics of indeterminacy. Although it is not abstraction per se that causes socially weightless thinking, it may be that radical democratic theory may be better placed to think about oppression by deploying abstractions that are, at least in the first instance, sociological rather than philosophical in nature. The aim of grounding political theory in sociological reconstruction rather than ontological construction would be to, in Charles W. Mills’s words, 'reflect the specificities of group experience, thereby potentially generating categories and principles that illuminate rather than obfuscate the reality of different kinds of subordination' (2005: 173; also Honneth 2012: 46-8).

# 1NR

## Case

### 1NR---AT: Environmental !

#### No environmental destruction

Stewart 20, Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at The University of Newcastle in Australia. (Mark G., 6-10-2020, "Climate Change and National Security: Balancing the Costs and Benefits", *Cato Institute*, https://www.cato.org/publications/climate-change-national-security-balancing-costs-benefits)

If climate projections are correct, a changing climate has the potential to cause sea levels to rise, floods, more intense storms and hurricanes, droughts, and other climate extremes. Such climate change would affect every nation, and populations in developing countries would be hit hardest. In the worst case, it would lead to energy and food scarcity, increase the spread of disease, cause mass migration of “climate refugees,” and weaken fragile governments.

That is all alarming stuff. However, those effects are often predicated on worst‐​case (and unlikely) carbon dioxide (CO2) emission scenarios and climate projections to 2100 and beyond, and they ignore technological innovations and adaptive behaviors.

This chapter focuses on climate change as a potential national security threat to the United States.1 Taking the projections as reality, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, contends that a significant upheaval related to the warming planet would “cripple the security environment” and is “probably more likely than the other scenarios we all often talk about.”2 Others claim that “climate change is becoming one of America’s most critical national security issues of the 21st century”3 or that “climate change represents a serious threat to the security and prosperity of the United States.”4

An open letter signed by 38 U.S. national security experts in 2013 states that climate change “presents a serious threat to American national security interests,”5 and a 2007 report by a military advisory board concludes that “climate change is a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world, and it presents significant national security challenges for the United States.”6

Not surprisingly, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review by the U.S. Department of Defense concludes that “climate change and energy will play significant roles in the future security environment” and highlights several specific climate threats to national security:

Opening of new territorial waters in the Arctic;

Regional instability caused by food and energy insecurity, and associated increases in refugees;

Vulnerability of military installations to hurricanes, storms, floods, sea‐​level rise, and other climate change–induced hazards; and

Increased use of military resources for humanitarian and largescale natural disaster missions.7

This chapter assesses such concerns. It estimates that those threats, should they materialize, could conceivably cost the U.S. government up to $20 billion per year. However, that cost would increase federal government outlays by no more than 0.5 percent, requiring an adjustment that is not very significant.8 For example, climate and extreme weather threats to military installations within the United States can be readily handled by adaptation strategies, such as seawalls, improved infrastructure resilience, and—as a worst case—relocation of bases to less vulnerable locations. The opening of the Arctic to shipping would require new icebreakers to patrol sea‐​lanes and investment in new infrastructure to support Arctic operations. And future humanitarian missions might be better handled by civilian agencies, such as the United Nations, if properly resourced.

In addition, global warming has benefits that should be considered. For example, the anticipated opening of the Northwest Passage and other “trans‐​Arctic” waterways by 2030 would reduce shipping times between Europe and Asia by 50 percent while opening up the area to the exploitation of more than $1 trillion of hydrocarbon and mineral resources.9

The United States has met many threats to its security in the past century, including two world wars and engagements in many parts of the globe. If the direst predictions are proved correct, climate change will adversely affect many facets of life in the United States—“business as usual” may not be an option, and climate change will require a whole‐​of‐​government response that will surely present challenges to the United States and its allies. However, to call it a “security threat” is excessive. And to keep matters in perspective, few if any analysts believe that climate change constitutes an existential threat to the United States. The very existence of some small island nations could be threatened by rising sea levels, but the United States is a large country with significant resources and adaptive capacity. It has proved to be a highly resilient nation, and it is reasonable to expect that admirable national trait to continue.

### 1NR---Antitrust Good

#### They said competition is bad, but we are impact turning it, it’s good for antitrust---two impacts:

#### 1---The disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power.

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

#### 2---Health consolidation spikes health care costs and drastically lowers quality of care---antitrust is reverse causal

Numerof 20, PhD @ Bryn Mawr, internationally recognized consultant and author with over 25 years of experience in the field of strategy development and execution, business model design, and market analysis (Rita, “Covid-Induced Hospital Consolidation: What Are The Impacts On Consumers, And Potentially The President,” *Forbes*, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ritanumerof/2020/11/11/covid-induced-hospital-consolidation-what-are-the-impacts-on-consumers-and-potentially-the-president/?sh=692d6fc94da0>)

Covid-19 has initiated yet another wave: A wave of hospital mergers and acquisitions that will have devastating consequences for public health if industry doesn’t soon execute an about-face. Whether because they’re on the brink of bankruptcy and have subscribed to the half-truth that size is protective, or because they think they can score some good deals and believe scale and success are synonymous, the financial fallout of Covid-19 has caused many hospital executives to make consolidation a core part of their future plans. With the intent of increasing care quality and decreasing consumer costs despite these challenging times, the merger between Shannon Medical Center and Community Hospital and partnership between Intermountain and Sanford Health are just two examples. There are multiple reasons why consumers absolutely cannot afford for industry to bulk up in an effort to weather this storm. The first is that the positive efforts executives claim consolidation will help them accomplish often prove to be futile. Research shows that wherever market concentration is high, there are also higher prices for both consumers and the employers who provide their healthcare coverage. In the absence of competition, costs increase and quality deteriorates. That’s the opposite of progress. Second, generally speaking, the union of two institutions with operational shortcomings only creates one larger institution with even more operational shortcomings! That’s not progress either. Third, Covid-induced consolidation will only make future progress many times more difficult. The larger an organization is, the more it will struggle to rapidly adapt to healthcare disruptions like we’re seeing today. Retail giants like Walmart, Walgreens, Amazon and CVS are pivoting to cater to healthcare consumer demands for affordability and accessibility. Right now, they’re still a blip on the radar relative to mainstream healthcare delivery, but they are looking to eventually corner the market and drive the industry forward. And as they continue down this path, consolidated healthcare systems will be left behind, potentially at the expense of the consumers in that area. The potential impact of continued consolidation on rural patients is especially concerning. Rural communities may have a limited number of the big-box retailers mentioned above. And the unfortunate fact of the matter is that when a larger hospital or health system purchases a smaller, rural hospital, it’s usually only a matter of time before the purchasing system realizes that unless they drastically pare down and reconfigure operations, the acquired hospital will never be profitable. Many eventually decide to close up shop, in some instances reducing or even eliminating rural patients’ options for care delivery. In the absolute worst-case scenario, this is exactly the reality all consumers could face if consolidation continues at its current pace. In theory and if left unchecked, all of the hospitals in the United States could be owned by only a handful of mammoth systems that then lack incentive to continually deliver quality services at lower total cost of care.

#### Health care antitrust is a premier vehicle for social change and solves the disproportionate racial impact of rising health costs.

Kritter 21, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, (Dani, March 2021, “Antitrust as Antiracist”, <https://www.californialawreview.org/antitrust-as-antiracist/>)

The [federal antitrust laws](https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws)—three statutes enacted over a century ago—are in the spotlight. The year 2020 brought a [new reckoning with corporate power](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/dec/18/google-facebook-antitrust-lawsuits-big-tech) and a [resurgent interest in using antitrust law](https://newrepublic.com/article/160646/biden-antitrust-blueprint-monopoly-busting) as a force for populist change. The “hipster antitrust” movement argues that the focus of antitrust policy should not be limited to market power and consumer welfare. Rather, antitrust can and should be a remedy for a suite of societal ills, from workers’ rights to campaign finance and income inequality. The year 2020 also marked an awakening to [racial injustice](https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/09/22/racial-justice-in-america-a-deeper-look/) in America. The deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery sparked nationwide outrage and demands to reform institutions built on systemic racism. Yet the recent plans for [antitrust reform](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/117th-congress-takes-early-steps-6904745/)—which primarily focus on monopolies in tech—ignore the fact that the antitrust status quo perpetuates [racial injustice](https://theappeal.org/how-antitrust-perpetuates-structural-racism/). But it doesn’t have to be this way. This blog identifies consolidation in healthcare and vertical restraints in franchising as two examples of how lax antitrust enforcement has disproportionately harmed people of color. It also argues that by dusting off existing antitrust tools, antitrust enforcement can be [antiracist](https://nmaahc.si.edu/learn/talking-about-race/topics/being-antiracist). Background: The Antitrust Toolbox Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws to check the power of massive corporations run amuck. These laws—the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, and the Clayton Act—were originally designed to control corporate power, protect individual economic freedom, and ensure a fair and equal society. But beginning in the 1970s when Robert Bork published the still-influential “[Antitrust Paradox](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/12/20/antitrust-was-defined-by-robert-bork-i-cannot-overstate-his-influence/),” courts slowly narrowed the focus of antitrust law to protecting consumer welfare. Today, antitrust enforcement prioritizes preventing the anticompetitive acquisition, exercise, or maintenance of market power that threatens consumer welfare and competition—a much narrower goal than its populist origins. Dusting Off the Tools Recent years have seen [bipartisan](https://www.axios.com/exclusive-poll-shows-bipartisan-support-for-tech-antitrust-action-c3794ff5-120d-44d8-bac1-58b033efbd8a.html) interest in reining in powerful corporations with more aggressive antitrust enforcement. One of the few agency voices calling for an antiracist approach to antitrust is Rebecca Slaughter, the acting chair of the FTC. Slaughter [has recently spoken out](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1583714/slaughter_remarks_at_gcr_interactive_women_in_antitrust.pdf) about using antitrust enforcement to “right the wrongs of systemic racism.” She challenges what she views to be a faulty premise of antitrust law: “that antitrust can and should be value-neutral, and therefore social justice problems like racism do not have a role in antitrust enforcement.” Slaughter argues that antitrust has never been and never will be value-neutral. Antitrust addresses market structures, and racism is entrenched in the historic and current market structures in the United States. When agencies make decisions about how to deploy antitrust tools, they can choose whether to reinforce these structural inequities or to dismantle them. Healthcare and franchising are two examples of how a shift in antitrust enforcement from “value-neutral” to antiracist can break down market structures that perpetuate racial injustice. Honing in on Healthcare Monopolies Consolidation in the healthcare industry is a driving force behind the sky-high cost of medical care and pharmaceutical drugs. Due to a wave of healthcare mergers, most hospital markets in the United States are dominated by a single corporate entity. The lack of competition means the dominant hospital is free to exercise market power by raising prices and restricting output. [Recent studies](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/health/covid-hospitals-medicare-rates.html) of prices for hospital and outpatient treatment report that healthcare mergers have resulted in large networks charging private insurers 2.5 to 3 times more than Medicare rates for the same patient care. These rising costs lead to higher insurance premiums paid by employers and individuals. Artificially inflated healthcare costs disproportionately burden people of color and create a barrier to accessing quality care. Black families spend a greater share of their household income on health care premiums and out-of-pocket costs than the average American family. And of the thirty million [uninsured](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2020/02/19/there-are-clear-race-based-inequalities-in-health-insurance-and-health-outcomes/) individuals in the United States, half are people of color. The [COVID-19 pandemic](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/racial-ethnic-disparities/index.html) has put this health inequity in sharp focus: racial and ethnic minority groups are more likely to contract the virus, get severely ill, and die from coronavirus infections. What can antitrust do? First, antitrust merger review can be antiracist. Mergers between competitors are scrutinized under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. When determining whether a merger lessens competition, the FTC, Department of Justice (DOJ), and courts consider the likelihood of anticompetitive effects. An antiracist application of the Clayton Act would consider racially disparate outcomes like health care costs, insurance premiums, and the quality of care provided as anticompetitive effects. Business practices that perpetuate systemic racism are anticompetitive because they exclude people of color from full participation in the market. And this exclusion is expensive: a study by Citigroup estimates that discrimination cost the U.S. economy [$16 trillion](https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/09/23/916022472/cost-of-racism-u-s-economy-lost-16-trillion-because-of-discrimination-bank-says) since 2000. Moreover, there is precedent for applying a broad conception of anticompetitive effects in merger review. In [Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v. United States](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/technology/tech-giants-antitrust-law.html), the Supreme Court held that a meager 7.2 percent combined market share of two merging shoe manufacturers was unhealthy market concentration under the Clayton Act. Chief Justice Earl Warren acknowledged that concentration in the shoe industry might offer some efficiencies and lower prices for consumers, but “the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses” was a priority. Therefore, agencies can and should argue that mergers that reinforce racial inequity substantially lessen competition. Second, antitrust enforcement actions can hone in on industries like healthcare where the anticompetitive effects are acutely felt by people of color. As California attorney general from 2011 to 2017, [Vice President Kamala Harris](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/health/kamala-harris-health-care.html) prioritized taking on healthcare prices through antitrust. Her investigation laid the groundwork for California’s suit against [Sutter Health](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/health/sutter-hospitals-medical-bills.html) for using its market power to raise prices and extort better deals from insurers, which resulted in a $575 million settlement. The DOJ and FTC should follow in California and Vice President Harris’s footsteps and crack down on healthcare, utilizing an antiracist approach.

### 1NR---Turn---Ethnic Cleansing

### 1NR---Case---Cosmopolitanism

### 1NR---Case---Lake

### 1NR---Case---Cap Turn

#### Their proposal of a New International is a justification for rapidly expanding global capital---it is a form of hyperdemocracy that cuts across classes and ignores the binaries at the core of capitalist system

**Ebert and Zavarzadeh in 2008**(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p.78-80)

**The "without's" here are supposed to mark the radical anti-essentialism of Derrida's "New International."** However, in its structures and features it is, like the space mapped by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in *Empire,* a site of liberal constitution, citizenship, and human rights. The "without's" do not change its essentialist liberalism and its social metaphysics, **they simply tum it into a hyperliberalism that obscures its essentialist foundation through excess. By proposing affect** ("affinity, suffering, and hope") **as the axes of association in the "New International" Derrida clouds the actual material relations of the social, which are constructed by labor and capital, and displaces freedom from necessity by freedom as human rights, which are in the end nothing more than the right to hold property and the legal protection that comes with it**. Human rights in the "New International," co-exist with the dominant class structures and the property regime. The inhabitants of the "New International"· are cosmopolitan citizens of a global civil society that masks the international division of labor and its class relations in a generalized humanity. **The cosmopolitan,** in his absolute singularity, **wanders across the word in secret connections with other singulars in the ecstasies of being "without**" ("without title, and without name, ... without coordination, without party, without country, without national community, ...without co-citizenship, without common belonging to a class," 85) that mark his nomadic (anti-essentialist) and rebellious, anti-normative subjectivity. **This is the stuff of which new populist business management theories are made**. **These theories construct the "new" bold global manager as a subject who makes decisions in the face of the undecidability of the market and forges a new ethics of organizing without organization** (e.g., "Unglued Organizations," "Deconstructing the Corporation," "Farewell Vertical Integration, Welcome Networks" in Tom Peters's *Liberation Management).* **The "New International" is the board room of global capitalism-to-come where the hard material conditions of international labor relations are obscured in utopian liberal fantasies.** Critics such as Tom Lewis point out that the "New International" is the space of the bourgeois utopia that Marx and Engels call "'true' socialism" ("The Politics of 'Hauntology' in Derrida's *Specters of Marx"* 146-153) and that its main concern is with the "most reasonable' social order and not the needs of a particular class and a particular time" (Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* 455). Aijaz Ahmad writes that the "New International" is the site of "antipolitics" ("Reconciling Derrida: 'Specters of Marx' and Deconstructive Politics" 104). To these and other critics, Derrida responds with anger, claiming that when he says **the "New International" is "without common belonging to a class" it does not mean that he has abandoned class and class struggle.** To interpret him otherwise, he claims, is a sign (and here he gives a version of the standard answer that he and his friends routinely give to all who critique him) that all oppositional critiques of him are based on shallow, "hurried and somewhat global readings" ("Marx & Sons" 239) and are "crude and demagogically polemical" (241) misinterpretations. Polemically he opposes polemic. The "correct" interpretation is "simply, another dimension of analysis and political commitment, one that cuts across social differences and oppositions of social forces (what one used to call, simplifying, 'classes')" ("Marx & Sons" 239). **The "New International,"** in other words, **is grounded in the assumption that there are social dimensions "outside" specific classes and that the social is an assemblage of hybrid relations** ("across social differences and oppositions"). **These hybrid relations work outside the structural antagonisms over the appropriation of surplus labor and, by placing "bosses alongside workers"** (Lewis, "The Politics of Hauntology' 149), **diffuse class conflict in heterogeneity and difference**. Derrida's commitment to class, it becomes clear, is a means for undercutting it by turning it into an indeterminate space that exists side by side with other contingent dimensions of the social and is thus one of many social meanings. **In its materialist sense, class is formed at the point of production: "The relations of production in their totality constitute what is called the social relations"** (Marx, *Wage-Labour and Capital* 29). **There is nothing outside these relations, which are constituted under capitalism (within which the architecture of the "New International" is set) by the private ownership of the means of production. To open up a parallel space and claim that it cuts across classes is to say that social relations are autonomous of class and are effects of cultural conflicts that are independent of property relations (**what forms class relations). Derrida's extra-class theory (of "another dimension") undercuts the logic of class by proposing that social logic is contingent and there are no dimensions that are prior or primary to others: "All that depends, *at every instant,"* every *"singular* situation" is different (239). **The theory of "another dimension" of the social constructs the social as a detotalized assemblage of contingencies, indeterminacies, and singularities. Difference and heterogeneity are the places of "hospitality" in the democracy-to-come** *(Politics of Friendship* 104), **which is a mystical space "without" class but not classless, a hyperdemocracy where excess of meanings turn it into a democracy of the indeterminate** ("to-come") **and the undecidable which is "the condition of decision wherever decision cannot be deduced from an existing body of knowledge ... as it would be by a calculating machine**" ("Marx & Sons" 240). Unlike existing democracies-which lack "rnessianicity *without* messianism" ("Marx & Sons" 251) and exclude the right to refuse rights and which also act in-differently according to the principle of "equality" that leaves out the "singular"-the democracy-to-come is the home of difference. **It is a refusal of "presence" and the binaries on which such a presence is structured; it keeps open the undecidable and thus responsibility which is an activating of ethics. It is a secret** *(Specters of Marx* 85) **whose secrecy can never be represented in language; it is always singular and, like a secret, sacred. The ideological role of the sacred (democracy-to-come) is to make all critiques of the worldly** (existing democracies) **irrelevant and beside the point; the democracy-to-come is a resecuring of democracy-as-is, putting it beyond question. Democracy-as-is is the arena of capital's exploitation of labor. The workers,** in Derrida's narrative, **will have to wait for justice-to-come. Democracy-to-come is a deferral of class struggles to make sure that the revolution never arrives**. Here and now, in existing democracies, **Derrida deconstructs binaries by representing them as part of the metaphysics of presence and thus makes speaking about class as the oppositional relations of labor and capital part of a discredited discourse oflogocentrism. However, fundamental binaries are not effects of an epistemological misreading, a closure of meanings, or discursive power relations. They are caused by the exploitation of the labor of workers by owners. Binaries are effects of the binary of labor and capital-they are constitutive of capitalism itself. As such, they reproduce themselves in all cultural practices and discourses, including Derrida's deconstruction of binaries and our own critique of it**.

### 1NR---Case---Method

### 1NR---Case---Realism